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Abstract
The ubiquity, dependability, and extensiveness of internet access has seen a migration
of local services to cloud services where the advantages of scalability can be efficiently
exploited. In doing so, the exposure of sensitive data to eavesdropping is a principal
concern. Asymmetric cryptosystems attempt to solve this problem by basing access on
the knowledge of a solution to mathematically difficult problems. Shor demonstrated that
on a quantum computer, cryptosystems based on the difficulty of factoring integers or
solving discrete logarithms were efficiently solvable. As the most ubiquitous asymmetric
cryptosystems in modern use are based on these problems, new cryptosystems had to be
considered for post-quantum cryptography. In 1978, McEliece proposed a cryptosystem
based on the difficulty of decoding random linear codes but the key sizes were too large for
practical consideration. These systems, though, do appear to resist Shor’s algorithm and
other quantum attacks. More recently, Gabidulin proposed using codes in the rank metric
to design secure cryptosystems because they could be designed with smaller parameters.
In this direction, many proposals for cryptosystems based on rank metric codes were
designed. Overbeck managed to cryptanalyze many of these systems, but there remain
several which resist all known structural attacks.
In this work, we investigate the use of rank metric codes for cryptographic purposes.
Firstly, we investigate the construction of MRD codes and propose some new construc-
tions based on combinatorial methods. We then generalize Overbeck’s attack and show
how our generalized attack can be used to cryptanalyze some of the cryptosystems which
were designed to resist the attack of Overbeck. Our attack is based on a new approach of
exploiting the structure of low weight elements in the code. Our approach also allows us
to extend a result of Gaborit to obtain a polynomial time decoding algorithm for codes
with certain parameters. Lastly, we consider the use of codes in the subspace metric–
which are based on rank metric codes–in order to create an alternative instance of Juels’
and Sudan’s fuzzy vault primitive.
Zusammenfassung
Die Allgegenwart, Zuverlässigkeit und Weitläufigkeit des Internet-Zuganges erlebt
eine Migration von lokalen Diensten zu Dienste auf der Cloud, wo die Vorteile der
Skalierbarkeit effizient genutzt werden können. Dabei ist die Gefährdung von sensi-
blen Daten durch Lauschangriffen ein Hauptanliegen. Asymmetrische Kryptosysteme
versuchen, dieses Problem zu lösen, indem Zugriff auf Daten, basierend auf der Lösung
eines mathematisch schwierigen Problem, vergeben wird. Shor zeigte, dass auf einem
Quantencomputer, auf der Schwierigkeit natürliche Zahlen zu faktorisieren oder Lösun-
gen diskreter Logarithmen basierende Kryptosysteme, effizient lösbar sind. Da die am
weitesten verbreiteten asymmetrischen Kryptosysteme heutzutage auf diesen Problemen
beruhen, mussten neue Kryptosysteme für die Post-Quantenkryptographie berücksichtigt
werden. McEliece hat ein Verschlüsselungssystem basierend auf der Schwierigkeit "ran-
dom linear codes" zu entschlüsseln, aber die Schlüsselgrößen waren zu groß für praktische
Anwendungen. Dieses System jedoch widersteht Shor’s Algorithmus und andere Quan-
ten Angriffen. Neuerdings hat Gabidulin Codes in der Rangmetrik vorgeschlagen um
sichere Kryptosysteme zu entwerfen, weil sie mit kleineren Parametern entwickelt werden
könnten. Danach wurden viele Vorschläge für Kryptosysteme auf Basis von Rangmetrik-
Codes entworfen. Overbeck konnte viele dieser Systeme Kryptanalysieren, aber es bleiben
einige, die allen bekannten strukturellen Angriffen widerstehen.
In dieser Arbeit untersuchen wir die Verwendung von Rangmetrik-codes für kryp-
tographische Zwecke. Zunächst untersuchen wir den Bau von MRD-codes und präsen-
tieren einige neue Konstruktionen basierend auf kombinatorische Verfahren. Wir verall-
gemeinern dann Overbecks Angriff und zeigen, wie unser allgemeiner Angriff verwendet
werden kann um einige der Kryptosysteme zu Kryptanalysieren, die so entworfen wurden,
dass sie den Angriff von Overbeck widerstehen. Unser Angriff basiert auf die Nutzung
der Struktur von Elementen im Code mit geringem Gewicht. Unser Ansatz erlaubt es uns
auch ein Polynomialer Zeit -Decodieralgorithmus für Codes mit bestimmten Parametern
zu erhalten, was die Erweiterung eines Ergebnis von Gaborit ist. Schließlich betrachten
wir die Verwendung von Codes in der Unterraummetrik -, die auf Rangmetrik-Codes
basieren - um eine alternative Instanz von "Juels’ and Sudan’s fuzzy vault primitive" zu
erstellen.
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Chapter 1
Foreword
Reliable and secure two-party communication is fundamental to the information age.
The prevalence of distributed information systems–for instance cloud storage, e-banking,
and social media–is in large part due to confidence in the ability to exchange information
in an effective way. Two principal goals in this direction are reliability and security of
the communication system. Reliability involves the ability of a receiving party to cor-
rectly observe an intended message whereas security refers to the ability for parties to
communicate in secret. The former of these concerns was pioneered in the seminal work
of Shannon in his 1948 paper entitled, The Mathematical Theory of Communication [69].
Considered one of the most influential works of the 20th century, the increase in com-
putational power of modern computers has been followed by an increased interest in the
applications of his work. His ideas can now ubiquitously be found in all communication
systems, but the development of the field of information theory in the pre-computational
era is a testament to his vision.
As an example of unreliable communication, consider a sender who wishes to transmit
either a 1 or 0 to the receiver. However, in the process of communication, the message
is corrupted in such a way that a uniformly random bit is received, regardless of the bit
that was sent. That is,
P (x sent | y received) = .5,
for any x, y ∈ {0, 1}. The receiver in this case has no ability to discern if the observation of
a 1 corresponded to a transmitted 0, or vice versa. In this case, there is no communication
scheme which can allow the receiver to recover information about the sent message. If,
on the other hand, we take p < 1/2 and we have
P (x sent | y received) =
{
p x 6= y
1− p x = y,
then we have a better chance of assuming the received bit is correct than incorrect. We
can use this information to our advantage; encode a bit x into a sequence of 3 bits, by
repeating x three times. For instance, instead of just sending a 1, send 111. Then, if
y1y2y3 is received, at least two of y1, y2, or y3 are equal to, b ∈ {0, 1}. Then, a receiver
observing y1y2y3 and guessing that b was transmitted has a good chance of being correct.
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Specifically, the probability of incorrectly recovering the transmitted bit by this majority
decoding scheme is
3∑
i=2
(
3
i
)
pi(1− p)3−i.
This value decreases to 0 as p → 0. We can also, instead of repeating a bit 3 times,
repeat it 2n+ 1 times and then the probability of failure to recover b will be
2n+1∑
i=n+1
(
2n+ 1
i
)
pi(1− p)2n+1−i.
For any p < 1/2, one can choose n large enough that this value can be made arbitrarily
small. Therefore, reliable communication can be achieved. The cost of being able to
recover the message correctly is that the rate of information transmission must decrease.
Out of every 2n+ 1 symbols sent in the example above, only one message symbol can be
transmitted. In general, this is not the most efficient encoding scheme, and the limits of
such schemes are one of the fundamental results of Shannon [69].
The basic point-to-point communication model involves only one sender and one
receiver, summarized in Figure 2.1. In modern communication systems, information
is often distributed between different sources and requested by multiple receivers. The
channel then consists of a network of nodes which transmit the information between each
other before finally arriving at the intended receivers. The point-to-point model under
these circumstances is no longer the most efficient means of communication. The study
of networks grew out of a motivation to understand the limits of communication through
networks, in which the sender(s) and receiver(s) are connected by nodes. While classical
coding theory focuses on designing codes in the Hamming metric, the rank metric and
subspace metric were found to be more amenable to the types of errors which occur in this
network context. One of the fundamental results in this field came from Ahlswede et al.
in which it was shown that by allowing the nodes to use algebraic operations rather than
simple routing, the capacity of a random network could be attained [2]. Sophisticated
techniques and constructions have since been developed, leading to a rich understanding
of the subject and a wide variety of applications. Peer-to-peer systems, online gaming,
distributed storage, and file-streaming services are examples in which communication can
be improved by using network ideas [19, 38].
The latter of our considerations–security–has found significant traction as the storage
of valuable data is increasing being handled remotely, where the need for authorized ac-
cess is paramount. This has motivated a deeper understanding of complexity–the ability
to describe how difficult certain problems are. While much remains to be discovered
in this area and important questions remain, the understanding of complexity has pro-
vided a basis for which all secure communication is based. In order to safely use remote
services, there must be a degree of confidence that the information being stored is se-
cure from possibly nefarious parties. Obvious examples include remote access to online
banking, social media accounts, or cloud storage services just to name a few. In order
to communicate securely, the sender and receiver should communicate via a private key
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which only they know, and which allows them to encrypt and decrypt information. To
an observer, the encrypted messages should leak as little information as possible about
the message itself and moreover the algorithm for encryption/decryption should be ef-
ficient. For remote parties without physical access or a secure channel, some method
must be devised in order to share the private key. Obviously, the private key cannot be
directly communicated, else an adversary could intercept it and also be able to decrypt.
The study of public-key cryptosystems grew out of this problem and is a widely heavily
studied topic due to its importance and applicability.
The most ubiqitous public-key cryptosystems are the RSA and ECC cryptosystems.
Both are based on number theoretic problems which are considered difficult to solve in
the absence of side information. The problem with both systems, however, is that they
are very efficiently broken by a large enough quantum computer [71]. It is believed by
some that the momentum of progress in quantum computing will inevitably result in a
practical quantum computer, at which time cryptosystems systems based on factoring or
the discrete logarithm will become vulnerable to attack. In the event of such a scenario,
it is imperative that new types of public-key cryptosystems are properly analyzed to
ensure they remain safe in the quantum computing age. In this direction, there are
several candidates. One of the first proposed is the McEliece cryptosystem, based on
the difficulty of decoding a random code. Lattice-based cryptosystems share a similar
fundamental problem and, recently, rank-based cryptosystems have received some special
attention. Considered very promising at first, many proposals were made and studied.
In [34] Gibson gave the first reasonable attack on proposed rank-based cryptosystems
and in [62] Overbeck extended the attack to break most of the existing proposals in the
literature. The weakness of these proposals was their reliance on Gabidulin codes–highly
structured codes in the rank metric. Since then, variants have been designed specifically
to resist Overbeck’s attack. Some are still based on Gabidulin codes, and some use
entirely new families of codes [29, 49, 64, 31].
One of the impediments for using rank-based codes is the scarcity of known inter-
esting families of decodable codes; it is why most early proposals used Gabidulin codes
and, consequently, were efficiently attacked by Overbeck. Of particular interest amongst
rank metric codes are the codes which meet the Singleton bound, called maximum rank
distance (MRD) codes. These codes have optimal trade-off between the rate of commu-
nication and the proportion of correctable errors. The study of MRD codes has led to
interesting constructions (for instance, see [70, 50, 16, 17]), although most are linear over
a subfield of the alphabet. Codes which are linear over an extension field are of particular
interest because they have a more efficient matrix representation, thus allowing for more
efficient storage and consequently a reduction in the public key size. However, aside
from a special case of generalized twisted Gabidulin codes, there have been no formal
constructions for MRD codes which are linear over the extension field.
In Chapter 2 we present the necessary background for motivating the results of this
thesis. In Chapter 3, we give some important constructions of codes in the rank metric,
as well as properties of MRD codes. Using these properties, we can construct small
examples of MRD codes which are linear over the extension field and are different from
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generalized Gabidulin codes. These are new MRD codes which are linear as codes over
the extension field and which are not equivalent to a generalized Gabidulin code. In
order to show this, we also give an algebraic criterion for determining if a code is a
generalized Gabidulin code. Chapter 4 contains a brief introduction to coding-based
cryptography and its extension to the rank metric. Several variants of cryptosystems
are presented, one of which has already been thoroughly cryptanalyzed by Overbeck–the
GPT cryptosystem–as well as several variants that have up to now not been broken. In
Chapter 5, we give a new attack that allows us to extend Overbeck’s attack to break
all the variants designed to resist it. This new attack is based on the consideration of a
different notion of support than is taken in other approaches. We also apply this attack
to a variant of the GPT designed by scrambling the private generator matrix by a non-
isometry. In Chapter 6, we first present a cryptographic primitive based on imperfect key
submission, first proposed by Juels and Sudan in [42]. We extend their idea to use codes
in the subspace metric, rather than the Hamming metric and examine some security and
design concerns.
4
Chapter 2
Background
One of the many insights of Shannon was to dissect the process of sending and receiving
a message into modular processes in such a way that each of these modular processes
can be examined independently. In order to understand these processes, he established
much of the language of what would eventually become information theory. While any
thorough treatment of the subject should include such language, we will not require such
generality. Rather, in this thesis we consider only algebraic and combinatorial aspects in
a restricted framework.
The point-to-point communication model we consider is presented in Figure 2.1. Our
model differs slightly from the one presented in [54]. This communication structure is the
impetus for the study of forward error correction; techniques that allow the receiver to
recover the message in the presence of channel errors, without the need to communicate
with the source. While the concept may appear simple, the techniques used can be quite
sophisticated. Depending on the channel and other considerations regarding efficiency
and reliability, codes can be quite exotic objects. All proofs and more details can be
found in [54, 9]
Let K be a finite field, N,n ∈ N. We mean by an encoding an injective map
ι : {0, . . . , N − 1} → Kn. The image of ι is called the code. The elements of a code
are called codewords. Suppose that K = Fq is the finite field of q elements and N = qk
for k < n. Then, we can associate elements from {0, . . . , qk − 1} with the elements of
Kk and view ι as a map from Kk to Kn. The image of an encoding map ι : Kk → Kn
which is linear will be called a linear code. We are primarily concerned with these codes
for practical purposes. If the encoding map ι : Kk → Kn is linear, and C = ι(Kk), then C
can always be given as the image of a matrix G ∈ Kk×n. Any such matrix representing ι
will be called a generator matrix for C. Moreover, all generator matrices are equivalent
up to multiplication on the left by an element of GLk(K).
The channel is the medium through which a codeword must travel before it is ob-
served by the receiver. During transmission, errors can occur, which will be modeled by
a stochastic function, ρ, on Kn. For a codeword x ∈ Kn, The decoder receives the sense-
word, y = x+ e, where e is a random element of Kn according to the distribution of ρ.
e will be called the error vector associated to the senseword y. The objective of forward
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Sender Encoder Decoder Receiver
ρ
Channel
Figure 2.1: Point-to-Point Communication Model
error correction is to design the map ι in a clever way so that even in the presence of
an error, the receiver can determine with high probability which codeword was sent. For
linear codes, knowledge of the codeword allows the receiver to easily recover the message.
For a vector x ∈ Kn, denote by xi the ith coordinate of x. We can consider Kn as a
metric space in the following way.
Definition 2.0.1. The Hamming metric, dH : Kn ×Kn → {0, ..., n} is given by
dH(x,y) = |{i | xi 6= yi}|.
i.e., the number of coordinates in which x and y differ.
Definition 2.0.2. The Hamming weight of a vector, x will be given by
wtH(x) = dH(x,0),
i.e., the number of non-zero coordinates of x.
Definition 2.0.3. Let C ⊂ Kn be a code. The minimum distance of C is given by
dminH (C) = min{dH(x,y) | x,y ∈ C,x 6= y}.
Definition 2.0.4. Let C be a k-dimensional subspace of Kn of minimum distance d.
Then, C will be called an [n, k, d]K linear code. The value n will be called the length of
C.
Definition 2.0.5. Let C be a linear code. The dual of C, denoted C⊥, is given by
C⊥ = {y | xyT = 0, for all x ∈ C}.
The following theorem can be found on page 25 of [9].
Theorem 2.0.6. Let C be a linear code of length n and dimension k. Then, C⊥ is a code
of length n and dimension n− k.
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We can define the Hamming ball around x ∈ Kn of radius r by
BHr,n(x) = {y ∈ Kn | dH(x,y) ≤ r}.
Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) be a codeword of C. Suppose now that K = Fq is the finite field
with cardinality q. Consider the channel which, for each coordinate xi of x, changes the
value of xi with probability p to a different element of Fq in a uniform way. Specifically,
define ρ by
ρ(xi) = xi + ε,
where
Pr(ε = a) =
 1− p a = 01
q − 1p a ∈ F
∗
q .
If we extend this to each coordinate of the vector, x, then a receiver will obtain a
vector of the form,
y = x+ e,
where the coordinates of e are determined by ρ. This channel is called the q-ary sym-
metric channel. It is natural that the Hamming distance allows us to correct errors in
this metric. In particular, we have the following:
Lemma 2.0.7. Let C be an [n, k, d]Fq code in the Hamming metric. Let x ∈ Fnq be
sent through the q-ary symmetric channel with transition probability p < 1/2 and y be
received. Then, there is a unique x such that
dH(x,y) ≤
⌊
d− 1
2
⌋
with probability
b d−12 c∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(1− p)n−ipi.
We note that if we fix n, k, and d, this value approaches 1 as p → 0. On the other
hand, if p is fixed, then there exists a code such that the probability of error in decoding is
arbitrarily small. In general, the ability to create a code for a given channel is a function
of the capacity of the channel. A more precise statement can be found in Chapter 2.2
of [54]. From the notion of the channel to that of a metric is a way of translating the
problem into one of geometry. One can consider the problem as one of sphere packing,
not necessarily arising from a channel. Different geometric problems are more amenable
to different channels, but generally, for any metric d∗, we have,
Lemma 2.0.8. Let C be an [n, k, d]Fq code with respect to the metric d∗. Then, C can be
used to correct any error vector, e satisfying d∗(x,x+ e) ≤ ⌊d−12 ⌋.
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There are different notions of correctability. What we mean here is that for any y ∈
Fnq , there is at most one codeword, x ∈ C such that dH(x,y) ≤
⌊
d−1
2
⌋
. Henceforth, when
discussing error-correcting codes we will often do so without mention of a channel. One
can assume, for instance, that there is an underlying channel producing errors which are
compatible with the respective metric, or simply ignore the channel in the communication
system altogether and consider the geometric packing problem as given in Lemma 2.0.8.
In terms of packing, there is a clear trade-off between the radius of the spheres and the
amount of spheres that can be packed into the space. An elementary estimate in the
case of the Hamming metric is the well-known Singleton bound, a proof of which can be
found on page 82 of [9].
Theorem 2.0.9 (Singleton). Let C ⊂ Fnq . Then,
dminH (C) ≤ n− logq |C|+ 1.
A code meeting the Singleton bound in the Hamming metric is called a maximum
distance separable (MDS) code. While the Singleton bound is not achievable for all
combinations of n and q, for n < q, there are examples of constructions for codes which
are MDS. Perhaps the most ubiquitous is the following.
Definition 2.0.10. Let α = (α1, . . . , αn) be a vector of distinct elements of F∗q . The
Reed-Solomon code of length n and dimension k with evaluation vector α is given by,
RSn,k(α) = {(f(α1), . . . , f(αn)) | deg(f) < k}.
Proposition 2.0.11. Reed-Solomon codes are always MDS codes, that is,
dminH (RSn,k(α)) = n− k + 1.
The last step in Figure 2.1 is the decoding step. In Lemma 2.0.8, the decoding problem
we consider is one of minimum distance decoding. In general, decoding is extremely
difficult. In Chapter 4 the difficulty of this problem is discussed. However, for codes
which are designed with some structure, efficient decoding algorithms can be given. One
of the breakthrough results in coding theory in recent years was the efficient list-decoding
of Reed-Solomon codes–the ability to compute all codewords within a ball of radius
larger than half the minimum distance [37]. Other codes which have efficient decoding
algorithms are BCH codes, Goppa codes, and LDPC codes.
2.1 Network Coding
Consider a communication system with possibly many senders and receivers, intercon-
nected by nodes, called a network. The senders inject packets of information into the
network, and the packets travel throughout the network via the node connections. The
behavior of the nodes largely determines the dynamics of the network. Figure 2.2 shows
the general setup for the network model.
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Figure 2.2: Network Model
Consider the case when nodes are simply allowed to route information and perform
no algebraic operations. Then, if a node receives multiple packets of data, it must choose
one to send forward. The canonical example of why routing is not an optimal solution
is the butterfly network, given in Figure 2.3. In this network, the source, S, wishes to
communicate the messages a and b to the receivers. If the source sends a to the first
node and b to the second, then the third node receives both a and b and must make a
choice. If node 3 chooses x = a, then the first receiver recovers only a, while the second
recovers a and b. Similarly, if x = b then the first recover obtain both a and b and the
second receiver only b. In either case, one receiver does not receive all the information.
Now, suppose that the nodes can take linear combinations of incoming packets. In
this case, if node 3 receives both a and b and forwards a + b, then the both receivers
can deduce a and b from linear combinations of the received packets. It was shown in
[2] that in the case of a single source, the maximum possible throughput of a network
can be achieved by allowing nodes to perform algebraic operations with a large enough
alphabet size.
The process of allowing nodes to perform algebraic operations is often called network
coding. In the case when the nodes perform only linear operations, it is often called
linear network coding. Suppose that the topology of the network is fixed and known,
i.e. the connections between nodes do not change with time and the senders know the
directed graph formed by the nodes. This is sometimes called coherent network coding.
For simplicity, consider only the case of one sender and one receiver. In this case and in
the absence of errors, the networks can be described by a matrix relation. Suppose that
S is the sender and R the receiver. S sends packets a1, . . . ,aM ∈ Fnq and R will receive
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Figure 2.3: Butterfly Network
packets b1, . . . , bN ∈ Fnq according to the relation
H
 a1...
aM

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
=
 b1...
bN

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
,
for some H ∈ FN×Mq .
In the process of forwarding these combinations, transmission errors may occur be-
tween the nodes. We will assume that the transmission errors are additive, as in the q-ary
symmetric channel. The directed graph defined by the node connections can therefore be
viewed as a channel, however, an error occurring between two nodes in a network has the
possibility of propagating and affecting all or many packets of information. Therefore,
the Hamming distance would be inappropriate for modeling the errors induced by this
channel. More specifically, if the nodes occasionally make additive errors as in the q-ary
symmetric channel, then R receives packets of the form HA+ Z, where Z captures the
information about the errors that occured in transmission. Since any error occurring
between two nodes in the network continues to be passed along by any other node re-
ceiving a corrupted packet, linear combinations of the errors will eventually reach the
receiver and the number of errors at the receiver will be bounded by the rank of Z. This
motivates the following definition.
Definition 2.1.1. Let A,B ∈ FM×Nq . The rank metric on FM×Nq is given by
dR(A,B) = rk(A−B).
This indeed defines a metric, and therefore one can consider coding as a packing
problem in this metric. Codes designed with respect to this metric are often called
Delsarte codes or rank metric codes. We will discuss this metric more in Chapter 3.
We note that even in the absence of errors, if M = N and the bi are simply a
permutation of the ai, the matrix A and B may have large rank distance. Kötter and
Kschichang noticed in [44] that in general, the subspace spanned by the ai is invariant
with respect to a more general network model. This observation led them to suggest that
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subspaces, rather than matrices should be the central objects for use in error correcting
codes for networks. In other words, the codewords should be elements of P(n,Fq), the
projective geometry of Fnq , i.e. the set of all possible subspaces of Fnq . P(n,Fq) can be
made into a metric space in the following way.
Definition 2.1.2. Let U, V ∈ P(n,Fq). The subspace distance is given by
dS(U, V ) = dim(U + V )− dim(U ∩ V ).
Considering codes with respect to dS relates problems of error correction in networks
to many problems in finite geometry. For more information as well as a brief backgroud
on open problems in this direction, the reader is referred to [23]. Often, codes defined
with respect to the subspace metric are referred to as network codes, although we will
refer to them as subspace codes to avoid ambiguity with other definitions.
Of particular interest in designing subspace codes is to consider only those codes,
C ⊂ P(n,Fq), with all codewords of C having the same dimension. We will denote the
(k, n)-Grassmann over Fq, i.e. the set of subspaces of dimension k in Fnq , by Gr(k,Fnq ).
We can therefore consider subspace codes which satisfy C ⊂ Gr(k,Fnq ) ⊂ P(n,Fq) for
some k. Such codes are often called constant-dimension subspace codes. If k is the
dimension of each subspace in a constant-dimension subspace code, then the maximum
possible minimum distance is 2k. In [44], a Singleton-like bound was given for any
constant-dimension subspace code, C ∈ Gr(k,Fnq ), having minimum distance d, as
|C| ≤
[
n− (d− 2)/2
max(k, n− k)
]
q
, (2.1)
where the q-binomial coefficient is as in Definition 3.1.5. An important family of constant
dimension codes, the spread codes are optimal packings with respect to dS. They arise
in finite geometry from the study of spreads.
Definition 2.1.3. A collection, S, of subspaces of Gr(k,Fnq ) is called an (n, k)q-spread
if U ∩ V = {0} for every U 6= V ∈ S and⋃
U∈S
U = Fnq .
It is well-known that spreads exist if and only if k divides n. In this case, the number
of elements of the spread is
|S| = q
n − 1
qk − 1 .
One can see that spread codes attain the bound in (2.1). For more information on
spreads, spread-like constructions, and decoding algorithms, the reader is directed to
[52, 36]. It was noted, for instance, that spread codes are closely related to rank metric
codes and can in fact be constructed from them. More generally, constant-dimension
subspace codes are closely related to rank metric codes [32].
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2.2 Public-Key Cryptography
Before the ubiquity of modern private and public key cryptography, secret messages were
hidden using steganographic methods and simple ciphers. Historical examples abound
of secret messages being concealed with invisible ink, tattoos, or embedded into physical
objects. As a modern method, secret messages can be embedded into digital files by
using the smallest bits of the data. Private key ciphers became more popular as the
use of machines grew, since it became more feasible to encrypt and decrypt large mes-
sages. Perhaps the most famous example, the Enigma machine, was used to encrypt
Nazi communication during WWII until it was broken by allied cryptanalysts. Modern
versions include algorithms such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Private
key ciphers share the same drawback–the key must first be known to both the sender and
receiver. Ideally, two parties would share the key through the use of a secure channel,
however secure channels are difficult or impossible to establish in practice. Ultimately,
the interested parties must communicate the private key in the presence of an adversary,
hence, the need to communicate secretly in public has led to great interest in public
key cryptosystems. These algorithms are generally much slower to encrypt and decrypt
messages than in private key systems. Therefore, a combination of the two is often used;
a public key cryptosystem is used to send a private key, which is used in subsequent
communication between the two parties.
The asymmetric cryptography model, give in Figure 2.4 ignores the possibility of
channel errors and focuses instead on the issue of secure communication–communication
in the presence of an eavesdropper. In this model, the receiver devises an encryption rule
which is communicated to the sender via the public key. The receiver does not publish
the private information that facilitates the decryption. Without the private information,
it should be extremely difficult for an eavesdropper to decrypt the ciphertexts. All
asymmetric cryptography schemes therefore rely on the same principle–finding a problem
in which some private information allows the intended recipient to efficiently solve, but
without that private information the problem is infeasible.
The study of the difficulty of solving certain problems belongs to the field of complex-
ity theory, and is one of fundamental importance to public key cryptography. Problems
which are deemed "efficiently solvable" would be bad candidates for basing a public key
cryptosystem upon, since they would provide little security against an eavesdropper. In
this section, we will give an introduction to some basic notions in complexity theory
which are the foundation for a heuristic about the difficult of solving certain problems.
A complete survey of results in this direction would be a tedious digression, but a short
introduction can be valuable to understand the context of public key cryptography. All
statements and further elaboration can be found in [75].
Problems will be separated into two types. A decision problem is one in which the
answer is given by ‘yes’ or ‘no’. For instance, ‘is n a prime number?’, or ‘is the graph G
3-colorable?’ are both decision problems. A search problem is one in which the answer
can not be given by a ‘yes’ or ‘no’. For instance, ‘What is the factorization of n?’ is a
search problem. Decision and search problems are often related. For instance, one can
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solve the problem ‘what is the factorization of n?’ if one can also solve ‘is r a factor of
n’ for any r.
Definition 2.2.1. A problem, P , is called polynomial, if there exists a polynomial, f ,
such that for any instance p ∈ P , the number of operations required to solve p is bounded
by f(n), where n is the size of the input. We say that P is polynomial in n.
The class of all problems which are polynomial is denoted by P. If every problem
in P with input size n can be solved in f(n) operations, then we say that P ∼ O(f).
We should note that the operations allowed are only those which can be performed on a
deterministic Turing machine. We will omit the descriptor, deterministic. For practical
purposes, we are interested in algorithms which are also allowed to use some element of
randomness in their algorithms. Therefore, we will also say that a randomized algorithm
is polynomial time if, on average, a solution can be found in polynomial time. Problems
which can be solved in polynomial time by a randomized algorithm do not necessarily
belong to P.
Some examples of problems which are in P include ordering a set of n integers,
computing the inverse of a matrix over a finite field, and testing an integer for primality
[1]. Not all problems are known to be in P. For instance, the best known algorithm
for factoring an integer of size n bits has complexity is O(2n1/3n2/3) [47]. From the
intuition that exponential functions grow significantly faster than polynomial ones (at
least asymptotically), in a cryptography context, one would want to design systems in
which the best known algorithms for breaking the system require a number of steps
exponential in the size of the input. This gives us the following definition:
Definition 2.2.2. An algorithm for solving a problem, P , will be said to have exponential
running time, if there exists ε > 0 such that
P ∼ O(2εn),
for an input of size n.
Again, we include randomized algorithms in this definition.
Definition 2.2.3. A decision problem, P , is said to be in NP if there exists a non-
deterministic polynomial time algorithm capable of solving P .
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Often, an equivalent definition is given in terms of a polynomial time certificate. A
polynomial time ‘yes’ certificate is some information that allows one–if the solution is
‘yes’–to verify in polynomial time that the solution is indeed ‘yes’. In these terms, a
decision problem, P is said to be in NP if there exists a polynomial time ‘yes’ certificate.
In other words, if you are told that the answer to the decision problem is ‘yes’, then a
‘yes’ certificate would allow you to prove that the answer is indeed ‘yes’ in polynomial
time. NP is then the class of decision problems in which a solution can be verified in
polynomial time.
Example 2.2.4. Consider the following problem: ‘For any given linear code, C ⊂ Fnq , any
point y ∈ Fnq , and any integer 0 < t < n, does there exist x ∈ C such that dH(x,y) = t?’
A ‘yes’ certificate in this case could be a point, x satisfying dH(x,y) = t. The verifier
can check in polynomial time that x is indeed in C, and that the distance is as required.
Therefore, this problem is NP.
Clearly, P ⊆ NP, as any algorithm itself acts as a ‘yes’ certificate. An important
subclass of theNP problems are the so calledNP-complete problems. A decision problem
P isNP-complete if any other decision problem inNP can be reduced to P in polynomial
time. That is, a decision for P can be used to efficiently obtain a decision for any other
problem in NP. Intuitively, these are the “hardest” NP problems.
It is widely believed that P 6= NP. If this is true, then any problem which is NP-
complete is not solvable by a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm. Otherwise, every
other problem in NP would be reducible to it, and hence P = NP. A class of problems
which are more difficult than the NP-complete problem are the NP-hard problems.
These are the problems (not necessarily in NP) which are intuitively at least as hard as
the NP-complete problems.
Since it is commonly believed that NP-complete problems are very difficult–in that
it is believed that there is no polynomial time algorithm solving any problem which is
NP-complete–one can design cryptosystems attempting to exploit this.
One of the most thoroughly investigated asymmetric cryptography schemes is that
of the RSA cryptosystem. The problem upon which the security of RSA is based is
the problem of factoring integers which are the product of two prime numbers (this is a
sub-problem of the general factorization problem). If n = pq is the prime factorization,
then a ‘yes’ certificate for the decision problem ‘is n the product of two prime numbers?’
can be, for instance, p or q. It is then easy to verify the ‘yes’ solution, so this decision
problem is in NP. It is not known to be NP-complete and is in fact believed not to be.
Because of its ubiquity and relative simplicity, we will present the RSA cryptosystem as
an example [66].
Example 2.2.5 (Rivest-Shamir-Adelman). Suppose that Bob wants to send a message
to Alice. Alice chooses two large prime numbers, p and q and computes n = pq. Then,
Alice finds an integer e, relatively prime to ϕ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1), the Euler ϕ function.
That is, e is invertible in the ring Z/(pqZ). Let d ≡ e−1 mod ϕ(n). Alice makes public
the key,
κpub = (n, e),
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and withholds the private key,
κpvt = (p, q, d).
Bob then chooses an element m ∈ Z/(nZ) to represent his message, and sends
c ≡ me mod n
to Alice through the public channel. Alice computes
cd = med ≡ m mod n,
since ed ≡ 1 mod ϕ(n). If the eavesdropper can factor n and obtain p and q, then the
value d can be computed from p, q, and e and therefore the cryptosystem is broken.
In Section 5.1, we will consider a subproblem of the MinRank problem which is
known to beNP-complete problem. This subproblem, called the rank syndrome decoding
problem, is conjectured to also be difficult although it is unknown whether it is NP-
complete or not. It was first proposed for use in cryptography in [28].
2.3 Fuzzy Cryptosystems
In many public and private key cryptosystems, only an exact knowledge of the key
allows one to gain access. There are conceivable instances in which this is not desirable.
Consider, for instance, the following scenario. Bob is about to die, and he wants to
bequeath his belongings only to those who, in life, were his true friends. In order to
determine if a friend is a true friend or a false friend, they must correctly answer some
questions regarding Bob’s preferences. For instance, Bob could give Alice the query,
‘what are my favorite movies?’. Bob cannot expect Alice to guess all of them correctly,
and indeed Bob cannot be expected to list all his favorite movies without accidental
omission. Nevertheless, he wants Alice to gain access if she can guess enough movies
without guessing too many incorrect ones (for instance, she should not be given access if
she lists all movies in existence). Bob will be dead when this process occurs, though, so he
cannot tell Alice if she is correct or not; there must be an automated way to determine if
she deserves the inheritance. Also, Bob can not write down the list of his favorite movies
in an easily distinguishable form or else it may be stolen.
The idea is to devise a system so that the system releases the correct key if and only
if Alice’s answer is close to Bob’s. Any party attempting to access the system will be
called a witness. An unintended party will be called an adversary and Alice (or any
intended party) will be called an authentic user. Bob’s data will be called the template.
The data itself will be composed of features. We say that a witness decommits the key if
the witness is a valid set of features for unlocking the system.
Another–more feasible and less vindictive–scenario arises in the problem of biometric
authentication. Biometrics are used to refer to any property of the body which is rela-
tively invariant with respect to time and can be used to uniquely identify an individual
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with high probability. Of course, the usual suspects–fingerprint and iris data–are bio-
metrics, but even processes like handwriting or speech are considered biometrics as well.
In these cases, even an authentic user often cannot perfectly reproduce the exact same
features in a reliable way.
An important precusor to the fuzzy vault scheme considered in Chapter 6 is the fuzzy
commitment scheme of Juels and Wattenberg [41]. Let C ∈ Fnq be a t-error correcting code
with respect to the Hamming metric with an efficient decoding algorithm, dec : Fnq → Fnq ,
and let h : Fnq 7→ F`q be a hash function. Let x ∈ Fnq be the template and let δ be any
vector such that c = x+ δ ∈ C. The fuzzy commitment, F , is then defined by
F (x, δ) = (h(c), δ).
In this case, the codeword c is the key.
Lemma 2.3.1. Let x′ be such that dH(x′,x) ≤ t. Then for any c ∈ C, the witness x′
can be used to decommit F (c,x) successfully.
Proof. If dH(x′,x) ≤ t, then dH(x′ + δ,x+ δ) ≤ t. Since x+ δ = c is a codeword of C,
we obtain dec(x′+ δ) = c. Simply checking the value of h(c) verifies that x′ was a valid
witness.
If an adversary submits y without knowledge of the template, then we do not expect
dH(y + δ) to be within distance t of x + δ. Therefore, decoding will not yield c and so
h(dec(y + δ)) 6= h(c). We then reject this witness.
One principal disadvantage to the fuzzy commitment scheme is that the decommission
of the key is not permutation invariant with respect to the features. In the scenario of
Bob’s bequeathment, the order of Alice’s answers should not affect the decommission
process. In other words, the fuzzy commitment scheme works well when the errors
occuring during feature extraction are amenable to the Hamming distance, but can fail
quite easily, otherwise. Other examples of primitives for fuzzy cryptosystems include the
fuzzy syndrome hashing scheme [51] and fuzzy extractors [22], and the fuzzy vault [42]
which is examined in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 3
Rank Metric Codes
Rank metric codes were introduced by Delsarte in [18] using association schemes and
proposed more recently under a different framework by Gabidulin [26]. Delsarte codes
are generalizations of the latter; their relationship and duality theory are described in
[65]. In this paper, we will consider rank metric codes defined in an extension field, E,
over a base field F. The degree of the extension will always be denoted by [E : F] = m.
We only consider finite fields, i.e. F = Fq and E = Fqm for some prime power, q.
Of particular interest are codes meeting the Singleton bound in the rank metric, called
maximum rank distance (MRD) codes. The first examples of such codes were given in
[18]. In [26], a family of such codes were constructed using linearized polynomials which
was later generalized in [45]. Sheekey in [70] constructed a new class of codes closely
related to Gabidulin codes which was later generalized in [50]. The codes arising from
the generalized Sheekey construction are in general not linear over the extension field,
but contain as special cases all the known linear (over the extension field) MRD codes.
Aside from these,there are no other known codes satisfying the Singleton bound which
are linear over the extension field Fqm . Other constructions exist which are non-linear or
linear only over a subfield of Fqm .
In this chapter, we introduce the rank metric and some fundamental tools that we will
use throughout the paper. In Section 3.1, we summarize some of the fundamental results
regarding rank-metric codes with an emphasis on the relationship between rank metric
codes and the coordinate-wise Frobenius map. We also give the characterization of the
linear, semi-linear, and Fq-linear isometries due to [57]. In Section 3.2, we proceed to
give some examples of rank metric codes. First, we present an important family of codes
for rank based public key cryptography–generalized Gabidulin codes. We also present
the construction of Sheekey. We then give some background for our construction of
new MRD codes. Our construction is sporadic and constructed by combinatorial means,
nevertheless, it proves a new construction of linear MRD codes which is not semi-linearly
equivalent to a generalized Gabidulin code. The results in this direction can be found in
[39]. Lastly, we present the low rank parity check (LRPC) codes, which are proposed in
[31] as a feasible alternative to Gabidulin based cryptosystems.
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3.1 Preliminaries
Let Fqm be an extension field over Fq. For a fixed basis, say {b1, ..., bm} ⊂ Fqm of Fqm
over Fq, any element a ∈ Fqm can be written uniquely as
a =
m∑
i=1
aibi,
for ai ∈ Fq. Hence, we can represent a as the column vector [a1, . . . , am]T ∈ Fm×1q in
the canonical way. Given an element x ∈ Fnqm , we can expand each coordinate into a
column according to this fixed basis, obtaining a matrix [x] ∈ Fm×nq . In this way, any
subset C ⊂ Fnqm can be viewed as a subset of Fm×nq . These are sometimes called Delsarte
(matrix) codes [65]. We will consider mostly the case when C ⊂ Fnqm is Fqm-linear and we
will call these linear rank metric codes as they agree with the alphabet of the code when
codewords are viewed as vectors. In order to distinguish those codes which are linear
over a subfield F′ ( Fqm , we will specify that the code is F′-linear. Clearly, all linear
rank metric codes are Fq-linear Delsarte codes, but not all Fq-linear Delsarte codes are
linear rank metric codes.
We can therefore define the rank metric for vectors to coincide with Definition 2.1.1
for matrices.
Definition 3.1.1. Let x,y ∈ Fnqm . The rank distance between x and y is given by
dR(x,y) = rk ([x− y]) . (3.1)
Lemma 3.1.2. The map dR : Fnqm × Fnqm 7→ {0, . . . ,m} given in (3.1) defines a metric.
Moreover, the distance is independent of the choice of basis for Fqm over Fq.
Proof. First, fix a basis B = {b1, ..., bm} for Fqm over Fq and let x,y, and z ∈ Fnqm . It is
clear that
dR(x,y) = rk([x− y]) = rk([y − x]) = dR(y,x).
Also,
dR(x,y) = rk([x− y]) ≥ rk([0]) = 0,
with equality if and only if x = y. For any matrices A,B of the same dimensions,
rk(A+B) ≤ rk(A) + rk(B). Therefore, we have
dR(x,y) = rk([x− y])
= rk([x− z] + [z − y])
≤ rk([x− z]) + rk([z − y])
= dR(x, z) + dR(z,y).
Therefore, dR defines a metric. To show the value is independent of the choice of basis, we
note that for any change of basis matrix S ∈ GLm(Fq), we have rk(S[x]) = rk([x]).
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The rank weight, or rank of a vector x ∈ Fnqm is simply given by
wtR(x) = rk(x) = dR(x,0).
Other ways to conceive of the rank of a vector x ∈ Fnqm is as the dimension of the Fq-
vector space spanned by the coordinates of x, or the number of coordinates of x which
are linearly independent over Fq. These can all be seen to be equivalent.
There is the possibility for ambiguity in the different notions of rank. However, it
should be clear by context what is meant. If M ∈ Fm×nqm is a matrix, by the rank of M ,
we mean the rank in the usual way; the number of linearly independent rows or columns
of M over Fqm . It is known that the row rank and the column rank of M are equal
when considered over Fqm . If M is a matrix with entries in Fqm , we will also consider
the Fq-span of the columns of M , the dimension of which will be called the column rank
(over Fq). It is not true that the column rank of M over Fq will equal the row rank over
Fq ifM has entries in Fqm . We will denote the column rank ofM over Fq by colrkFq(M).
If x ∈ Fnqm , by the rank of x, we mean the rank weight of x.
Denote the rank sphere of radius r around x ∈ Fnqm by
SRr,n(x) = {y ∈ Fnqm | dR(x,y) = r}, (3.2)
and the rank ball of radius r around x ∈ Fnqm by
BRr,n(x) = {y ∈ Fnqm | dR(x,y) ≤ r} =
r⋃
i=0
SRr,n(x). (3.3)
From Definition 3.1.1 we can observe that for any x ∈ Fnqm , wtR(x) ≤ wtH(x), and
therefore it follows that for any 0 ≤ r ≤ min{m,n},
BHr,n(x) ⊆ BRr,n(x).
In a restricted way, the rank metric generalizes the Hamming metric; any subset of Fnqm
viewed as a code in the rank metric capable of correcting t errors will also correct t errors
in the Hamming metric. On the other hand, the same subset may be able to correct
more errors when viewed directly as a code in the Hamming metric.
In order to determine the cardinality of BRr,n(0) ⊂ Fnqm , we use the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1.3. Suppose r ≤ n. Then, the map
ϕ : SRr,r(0)×Mr×n(Fq)/GLr(Fq) −→ SRn,r(0),
(v, U) 7−→ vU
is a bijection.
Proof. As representatives of the cosets in Mr×n(Fq)/GLr(Fq) we consider the reduced
row echelon form of the respective row span of the elements of the coset.
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We first show that ϕ is surjective. For this consider an arbitrary element in the image
of ϕ, i.e. a vector x ∈ Fnqm of rank r, and let xi1 , . . . , xir be the first r independent entries
of x, in positions i1, . . . , ir. Then, the remaining n− r entries of x can be expressed as
an Fq-linear combination of xi1 , . . . , xir , thus we can write x = (xi1 , . . . , xir)M for some
matrix M ∈ Ft×nq . Then there exists S ∈ GLr(Fq) such that U = S−1M is in reduced
row echelon form. We get (xi1 , . . . , xir)S ∈ SRr,r(0) and x = ϕ((xi1 , . . . , xir)S,U), thus ϕ
is surjective.
To show injectivity, suppose that there are two pre-images, i.e. x = ϕ(v, U) =
ϕ(v′, U ′). Without loss of generality, we can assume that U = [Ir | ∗]. Denote by
U ′j the jth column of U
′. Then we have
(x1, . . . , xr) = v = (v
′U ′1, . . . ,v
′U ′r).
Since v has rank r, U ′1, . . . , U ′r must be non-zero. Because U ′ is in reduced row echelon
form, we get U ′ = [Ir | ∗] and hence
(x1, . . . , xr) = v = v
′.
We furthermore have xj = vUj = v′U ′j for j = r + 1, . . . , n. Thus
vUj = v
′U ′j ⇔ vUj = vU ′j ⇔ v(Uj − U ′j) = 0.
Since rk(v) = r, we get Uj − U ′j = 0 for j = r + 1, . . . , n. Thus U = U ′ and we have
shown that ϕ is injective.
Lemma 3.1.3 was observed, for instance, in [33, 73]. The rank metric can also be
studied over other fields than finite fields [67], although we only consider the finite field
case.
Definition 3.1.4. Let V be a vector space of finite dimension, n, over some field K. The
(k, n)-Grassmannian of V , Gr(k, V ) is the space of k-dimensional K-subspaces of V .
For k ≤ n, each element of Gr(k,Fnq ) can be represented as the row span of some
full rank matrix belonging to Fk×nq . This representation can be made unique by, for
instance, considering the reduced row echelon form matrix associated to each subspace
U ∈ Gr(k,Fnq ).
Definition 3.1.5. The q-binomial coefficient, or Gaussian binomial coefficient, is the
number of r-dimensional Fq-subspaces of Fnq . For r ≤ n, it is given by[
n
r
]
q
=
r−1∏
i=0
qn − qi
qr − qi .
Corollary 3.1.6. We have,
∣∣BRr,n(0)∣∣ = r∑
i=0
[
n
i
]
q
r−1∏
j=0
(qm − qj) (3.4)
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Proof. We first observe that
|SRr,r,(0)| =
r−1∏
j=0
(qm − qj).
Then, using Lemma 3.1.3, we have that
∣∣BRr,n(0)∣∣ = r∑
i=0
|SRr,n(0)|
=
r∑
i=0
|SRr,r(0)| · |Mt×n(Fq)/GLt(Fq)|
=
r∑
i=0
[
n
i
]
q
r−1∏
j=0
(qm − qj).
Corollary 3.1.6 can be found in [33] with the connection with the Grassmannian
given in [76]. We will need to establish some preliminary notation that will be used
throughout this paper. Let M = (Ma,b) be a matrix (or vector) over Fqm . If K is a
sub-field or extension field of Fqm , we denote the K-span of the rows of M by 〈M〉K.
For any non-negative integer i, we will use the shorthand, [i], to mean the ith Frobenius
power, qi. Lastly, we will denote the coordinate-wise Frobenius map by, M ([i]) = (M [i]a,b),
that is, each entry of M raised to the [i]th power. For a subset S ⊂ Fnqm , we define
S([i]) = {s([i]) | s ∈ S}.
The following proposition summarizes some important properties of the coordinate-
wise Frobenius map.
Proposition 3.1.7. Let M ∈ Fa×bqm , i ∈ Z.
1. 〈M〉([i])Fqm = 〈M ([i])〉Fqm ,
2. If M ∈ Fa×bq ⊂ Fa×bqm , then M = M ([i]),
3. If N ∈ Fb×cqm , then (MN)([i]) = M ([i])N ([i]).
Proof. To prove statement 1, we show that 〈M〉([1])Fqm = 〈M ([1])〉Fqm from which the result
follows by repeated applications of the coordinate-wise Frobenius map. Let M1, . . . ,Ma
be the rows of M . Any element m ∈ 〈M〉([i])Fqm can be written
m =
(
a∑
i=1
αiMi
)([1])
=
a∑
i=1
α
([1])
i M
([1])
i ∈ 〈M ([1])〉Fqm .
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Similarly, for m ∈ 〈M ([1])〉Fqm ,
m =
a∑
i=1
αiM
([1])
i =
(
a∑
i=1
α
([m−1])
i Mi
)([1])
∈ 〈M〉([i])Fqm ,
since for any α ∈ Fqm , (α([m−1]))([1]) = α. Statement 2 follows since the Frobenius
automorphism, σ : x 7→ x[1], fixes elements of Fq, and statement 3 follows from σ being
an automorphism of Fqm .
The following properties of the coordinate-wise Frobenius map will be used through-
out the paper. The first statement follows straightforwardly from the Fq-linearity of the
Frobenius map, the second and the third follow immediately from Proposition 3.1.7 and
can be found, for instance, in [35, 39].
Lemma 3.1.8. The following hold for any prime power [i] = qi and 0 < n ≤ m.
1. Let x ∈ Fnqm have rank r. Then, x([i]) also has rank r.
2. Let M ∈ GLn(Fqm). Then, (M−1)([i]) = (M ([i]))−1.
3. Let S ⊂ Fnqm be an Fqm-subspace. Then, S([1]) = S if and only if S has a basis
contained in Fnq .
Corollary 3.1.9. Let x ∈ Fnqm have rank r with decomposition x = xˆU according to
Lemma 3.1.3. Then,
〈x,x([1]), . . . ,x([r−1])〉Fqm = 〈U〉Fqm .
Proof. Since U has entries in Fq, by Proposition 3.1.7, x([i]) = xˆ([i])U and therefore,
x([i]) ∈ 〈U〉Fqm for every i. We show that x, . . . ,x([r−1]) are independent over Fqm .
Suppose on the contrary that they are dependent. Then, since U has rank r, we would
have
x([r−1]) =
r−2∑
i=0
γix
([i]) ∈ 〈x, . . . ,x([r−2])〉Fqm ( 〈U〉Fqm .
We note that γ0 6= 0, otherwise x would have rank smaller than r, a contradiction. Then,
〈x, . . . ,x([r−2])〉([1])Fqm = 〈x
([1]), . . . ,x([r−1])〉Fqm = 〈x, . . . ,x([r−2])〉Fqm .
and by the third point of Lemma 3.1.8, 〈x, . . . ,x([r−2])〉Fqm has a basis of elements in
Fq. However, this contradicts Lemma 3.1.3 since we could express x = xˆU ′, where
U ′ ∈ F(r−1)×nq .
Corollary 3.1.10. Let x ∈ Fnqm have rank r with decomposition x = xˆU according to
Lemma 3.1.3. Then,
〈[x]〉Fqm = 〈U〉Fqm .
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Corollary 3.1.10 can be found in [43], where the space 〈U〉Fqm is called the rank
support. From Corollary 3.1.9, we see that r + 1 consecutive coordinate-wise Frobenius
powers of x must be dependent, if x has rank r. Therefore, there exists some linear
combination γ0, . . . , γr−1 ∈ Fqm such that
x([r]) +
r−1∑
i=0
γix
([i]) = 0, (3.5)
from which we obtain the following definition.
Definition 3.1.11. Let x ∈ Fnqm have rank r, and γ0, . . . , γr−1 be as in Equation (3.5).
Then,
Z [r] +
r−1∑
i=0
γiZ
[i],
is called the annulator polynomial of x.
The annulator polynomial depends only on the Fq-span of the coordinates of x. In
particular, if x = (x1, . . . , xn), the unique smallest degree monic polynomial vanishing
on the set 〈x1, . . . , xn〉Fq ⊂ Fqm is precisely the annulator polynomial. We note that
dim(〈x1, . . . , xn〉Fq) = r, so the smallest degree polynomial vanishing on 〈x1, . . . , xn〉Fq
must have degree [r]. The annulator polynomial is defined this way, for instance, in
[59, 30]. However, we choose our definition because it is constructive, rather than a
statement of existence.
Because the annulator polynomial captures the information regarding the Fq-subspace
spanned by the coordinates of x, we will call 〈x1, . . . , xn〉Fq the vector space support of x.
In [30], this is simply referred to as the support of x, although we make the distinction for
the following reason. Recall that if x = xˆU , then U is determined up to a left action of
GLrk(U)(Fq). That is, 〈U〉Fq is invariant with respect to the choice of decomposition of x.
Therefore, we can think of 〈U〉Fq as encoding some information about the distribution,
or location, of the values of x. From Lemma 3.1.3, 〈U〉Fq can be viewed as an element of
the Grassmann space, Gr(r,Fnq ), and therefore we will call 〈U〉Fq the Grassmann support
of x. By abuse of notation, we will also call 〈U〉Fqm the Grassmann support of x, since
it is often more useful to consider this larger space. The analog between the Grassmann
support in the rank metric and the coordinates of the error in the Hamming metric were
observed to some degree in [61, 33].
To summarize, if x = xˆU as in Lemma 3.1.3, then 〈x1, . . . , xn〉Fq = 〈xˆ1, . . . , xˆr〉Fq is
called the vector space support of x and 〈U〉Fq is called the Grassmann support. These
two notions almost uniquely determine x. In order to have a bijection as in Lemma 3.1.3,
we simply need to associate each space 〈U〉Fq to a single matrix from GLr(Fq)U . This is
analogous to the case in the Hamming metric, where a vector is uniquely determined by
the values of the coordinates, together with the location of those values. We will denote
the vector space support and Grassmann support of x by suppvs(x) and suppGr(x),
respectively.
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We can furthermore extend the definition of the Grassmann support for matrices.
First, recall that for a matrix M ∈ Fk×nqm of rank r, one can write
M = M ′U,
where M ′ ∈ Fk×rqm and U ∈ Fr×nqm both having rank r. A slight modification of this idea
gives the following:
Proposition 3.1.12. Let M ∈ Fk×nqm have column rank t over Fq. Then, we can write
M = M ′U, (3.6)
with M ′ ∈ Fk×tqm and U ∈ Ft×nq of rank t. This decomposition is unique up to choice of
representation of 〈U〉Fq .
Proof. Let Mi1 , ...,Mit denote the first t independent columns of M . Then, every other
column of M can be written as an Fq-linear combination of these, so that for some
U ∈ Ft×nq ,
M =
[
Mi1 Mi2 . . . Mit
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
M ′
U.
If M = N ′V is another such decomposition, then the Fq-span of the columns of M ′
must equal the Fq-span of the columns of N ′. Therefore, there is an invertible matrix
S ∈ GLt(Fq) such that M ′S = N ′. Then, we have
M ′U = N ′V = M ′SV,
and therefore we must have SV = U , so they have the same row space.
We will call 〈U〉Fqm the Grassmann support of M and denote it by suppGr(M) =
〈U〉Fqm . To further justify extending the definition in this way, we observe the following:
Corollary 3.1.13. Let M ∈ Fk×nqm be such that colrkFq(M) = t and let U ⊂ Fnqm be
the Grassmann support of M . Then, any element x ∈ 〈M〉Fqm has Grassmann support
contained in U .
One goal in coding theory is to classify codes by isometry. LetM be a vector space
over a field K with distance function d∗. Recall that a map f : M → M is called an
isometry if d∗(m) = d∗(f(m)), for each m ∈ M. The space of all isometries on M ,
Iso(M) is a group under composition. An important class of isometries are the the linear
isometries, denoted by Lin(M) ⊂ Iso(M), which are the isometries which are also linear
maps fromM toM. For a linear code C and any linear isometry, ϕ, ϕ(C) is also a linear
code and moreover if G is a generator matrix for C, then f(G) is a generator matrix
for ϕ(C). Hence we can define an equivalence relation on the set of linear codes by the
classes arising from the action of these linear isometries. Codes C1 and C2 will be called
(linearly) equivalent, if there exists a (linear) isometry, f , so that f(C1) = C2. Equivalent
codes have identical parameters.
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In the case of the Hamming metric in Fnq , the Fq-linear isometries of Fnq are known to
be isomorphic to F∗q onSn [9]. This is realizable as multiplication on the right by diagonal
matrices with all non-zero entries as well as right multiplication by a permutation matrix.
Morrison studied different isometry classes of rank metric codes in [57]. In particular,
it was shown that
Lin((Fnqm , dR)) ∼= (F∗qm ×GLn(Fq))/N,
where N = {(λ, λIn) | λ ∈ F∗q}. Berger knew earlier in [5] that any linear isometry of the
rank metric could be expressed as a multiplication by an element of Fqm and an element
of GLn(Fq), but the structure was deduced by Morrison.
In addition to giving the group structure of Lin((Fnqm , dR)), Morrison classified the
semi-linear and Fq-linear rank metric isometries of Fqm .
Definition 3.1.14. Let V be a K-vector space. A map f : V → V is called semi-linear
if for every v,w ∈ V , and every λ ∈ K, there exists ν ∈ K such that
1. f(v +w) = f(v) + f(w),
2. f(λv) = λνf(v).
Like linear isometries, semi-linear isometries also map subspaces to subspaces. More
precisely we have the following.
Proposition 3.1.15. Let C be a subspace of Fnqm , and f a semi-linear isometry such that
f(λv) = λνf(v) for each v ∈ Fnqm . Then f(C) is also a subspace of Fnqm .
Proof. Let c1, . . . , ck be a basis for C. We have,
f
(
k∑
i=1
aici
)
=
k∑
i=1
aνi f(ci) ∈ 〈f(c1), . . . , f(ck)〉Fqm .
Thus,
f(〈c1, . . . , ck〉Fqm ) ⊆ 〈f(c1), . . . f(ck)〉Fqm , (3.7)
and since f is an isometry, the cardinalities of the set of Equation (3.7) must be equal,
and therefore f(C) is a subspace of Fnqm .
We say that C1 is semi-linearly equivalent to C2 if there exists a semi-linear isometry,
f , such that f(C1) = C2. From Lemma 3.1.8 we saw that the coordinate-wise Frobenius
map is a semi-linear isometry of Fnqm . Morrison showed that, together with the linear
isometries, it generates the space of semi-linear isometries. Explicitly, the space of semi-
linear isometries can be given by
Lin((Fnqm , dR))oGal(Fqm/Fq), (3.8)
and any semi-linear isometry can be realized by the composition of the linear isometries
with the coordinate-wise Frobenius map.
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If we consider only susbet of Fnqm which are Fq-linear, then the semi-linear isometries
above act on these spaces as Fq-linear isometries. If we consider an element in x ∈ Fnqm
as an m×n matrix, [x], then the Fq-linear maps can be represented in the following way
[57].
Theorem 3.1.16. Let f : Fnqm → Fnqm be an isometry of the rank metric such that f is
an Fq-linear map. Then, there exists L ∈ GLm(Fq), M ∈ GLn(Fq) such that
f(a) =
{
L[a]M for all a ∈ Fnqm
L[a]TM for all a ∈ Fnqm ,
where the latter can occur only if m = n.
If C1 and C2 are isometric by an Fq-linear isometry, we will say that C1 and C2 are
sub-linearly equivalent.
3.2 Code Constructions
While there are numerous examples of constructions of codes with efficient decoding
algorithms for codes in the Hamming metric, the variety of code constructions is sparser
in the case of rank metric codes. In this section, we will summarize the important
known results for codes linear MRD codes–the generalized Gabidulin codes and more
generally codes from Moore matrices [26], a twisted Gabidulin construction [70, 50], a
new maximum rank distance code construction, and the low rank parity check codes [31].
There has been significant interest in the construction of maximum rank distance
(MRD) codes which are not required to be Fqm-linear–Delsarte codes. Interesting achieve-
ments include a non-linear construction by Cossidente, Marino and Pavese [16], the es-
tablishment of a connection between Delsarte codes and semi-fields by Sheekey [70], and
a generalization by Lunardon [50]. These constructions are in general not linear over
Fqm , but in the case when they are in fact linear, there are no other known examples
of Fqm-linear MRD codes. One of the important properties of Fqm-linear MRD codes is
the fact that they can be presented far more efficiently than their counterparts which
are only linear over a subfield. For example, a rank metric code of Fq-dimension mk in
Fnqm has cardinality qmk and requires km basis elements to represent the space. Since
each basis element belongs to Fnqm , a presentation of the code would require km2n log q
bits. An Fqm-linear code of dimension k also has qmk elements, however, requires only
kmn log q bits to represent, thus saving a factor of m in the presentation size.
In Theorem 3.2.28 we present a construction of an MRD code which is linear over
the alphabet Fqm which is not semi-linearly equivalent to a generalized Gabidulin code.
3.2.1 MRD Codes
The classical way of defining Gabidulin codes is to view them as a q-analog of Reed-
Solomon codes, that is, as the evaluation of q-polynomials. Denote the space of q-
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linearized polynomials over Fqm by
Fqm [x](q) =
{∑
i
fix
([i]) | fi ∈ Fqm
}
.
For f ∈ Fqm [x](q), the q-degree of f is the power of the highest monomial term with
non-zero coefficient. The subspace of polynomials of degree at most [k] will be given by
L(q)k (Fqm) = {f ∈ Fqm [x](q) | the q-degree of f is at most [k]}.
Definition 3.2.1. Let 0 ≤ k ≤ n ≤ m, and γ = {γ0, . . . , γn−1} ⊂ Fqm be a set of
elements which are independent over Fq. The Gabidulin code, Gabn,k(γ) is given by,
Gabn,k(γ) = {(f(γ0), . . . , f(γn−1)) | f ∈ L(q)k (Fqm)}.
The Singleton bound for codes in the Hamming metric also gives a bound for codes
in the rank metric.
Theorem 3.2.2. [26] Let C ⊆ Fnqm be a rank metric code with minimum rank distance
d. Then,
logq |C| ≤ max{m,n}(min{m,n} − d+ 1).
Proof. We can assume thatm ≥ n or else consider the code in which all elements of C con-
sidered as matrices are transposed. Suppose that x ∈ C is a codeword of minimum rank
distance, d ≤ n. Let σ ∈ GLn(Fq) be an isometry such that xσ = (x1, . . . , xd, 0, . . . , 0).
Cσ is then a code of minimum Hamming distance d, since any element with fewer than
d non-zero coordinates would have minimum rank distance smaller than d, contradicting
d the minimum rank distance of C. Therefore, Cσ must satisfy the Singleton bound for
the Hamming distance, logqm(C) ≤ n − d + 1. Since Cσ is isometric to C, we obtain the
result.
Definition 3.2.3. A code attaining the Singleton bound is called a maximum rank
distance (MRD) code.
Since x, x[1], ..., x[k−1] form a basis for L(q)k (Fqm), we can write down the canonical
generator matrix for the Gabidulin code, Gabn,k(γ), as
γ0 γ1 . . . γn−1
γ
[1]
0 γ
[1]
1 . . . γ
[1]
n−1
...
γ
[k−1]
0 γ
[k−1]
1 . . . γ
[k−1]
n−1
 . (3.9)
Gabidulin codes were later generalized by Kshevetskiy and Gabidulin in [45] as fol-
lows.
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Definition 3.2.4. Let γ = {γ0, . . . , γn−1} ∈ Fqm be linearly independent over Fq and
s ∈ N be such that gcd(s,m) = 1. The generalized Gabidulin code GGabn,k,s(γ) is the
linear code with generator matrix
γ0 γ1 . . . γn−1
γ
[s]
0 γ
[s]
1 . . . γ
[s]
n−1
...
γ
[s(k−1)]
0 γ
[s(k−1)]
1 . . . γ
[s(k−1)]
n−1
 .
It is well-known that the roots of xq − x in Fqm are exactly the elements of Fq. For
our main results we need a generalization of this result and some preliminaries which can
be found in [48].
Lemma 3.2.5. If gcd(s,m) = 1, then the roots in Fqm of x[s]−x are exactly the elements
of Fq.
Proof. Consider the field Fqms , so that both Fqm and Fqs can be viewed as subfields [48,
Theorem 2.6]. Since m and s are coprime these two subfields only intersect in the base
field Fq. Moreover, the roots of x[s] − x in Fqms are exactly the elements of Fqs , hence
the roots of it in Fqm are the elements of Fq.
Corollary 3.2.6 ([45]). Generalized Gabidulin codes are MRD codes.
Proposition 3.2.7. [18, 45]
1. Let C ⊆ Fnqm be an MRD code of dimension k. Then the dual code C⊥ ⊆ Fnqm is an
MRD code of dimension n− k.
2. The family of Generalized Gabidulin codes is closed under the action of taking duals.
Specifically, if gcd(s,m) = 1, then
GGabn,k,s(γ)⊥ = GGabn,n−k,s(β),
for some β = {β1, . . . , βn} a set of independent elements over Fq.
Generalized Gabidulin codes are closely related to Moore matrices which were intro-
duced and studied in [56]. We can easily verify some of their elementary properties.
Definition 3.2.8. A matrixM ∈ Fk×nqm is called a Moore matrix if there exists a α ∈ Fnqm
such that row i of M is equal to α([i−1]) for i = 1, . . . , k. α is called the generator of M .
Corollary 3.2.9. Let M ∈ Fk×nqm be a Moore matrix of column rank k ≤ t ≤ n over Fq.
Then, we can write
M = M ′U, (3.10)
with M ′ ∈ Fk×tqm a generator matrix of a Gabidulin code, and U ∈ Ft×nq .
Proof. Let columns i1, ..., it be independent. Then these columns form a Gabidulin code
of length t. From Proposition 3.1.12 we obtain the result.
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Lemma 3.2.10. Fix 1 ≤ k ≤ n ≤ N , and let M ∈ Fk×Nqm be a Moore matrix with
generator α, where rk(α) = n ≤ m.
1. 〈M〉Fqm has dimension k, and minimum rank distance n− k + 1.
2. If 0 < k < n, then dim
(
〈M〉Fqm ∩ 〈M〉([1])Fqm
)
= k−1 and dim
(
〈M〉Fqm + 〈M〉([1])Fqm
)
=
k + 1.
3. If A ∈ Fk×Nqm is another Moore matrix thenM+A is also a Moore matrix. Moreover,
if the column rank of A is equal to r < n− k+ 1, then the minimum rank distance
of 〈M +A〉Fqm is at least n− k + 1− r.
4. If the minimum rank distance of 〈M〉Fqm is d > 1, then the minimum rank distance
of 〈M〉Fqm + 〈M ([1])〉Fqm is equal to d− 1.
5. If the minimum rank distance of 〈M〉Fqm is d > 1, and E ∈ FN×(N−s)q is a full rank
matrix, thenME is a Moore matrix and the minimum rank distance of 〈ME〉Fqm =
〈M〉FqmE is at least d− s.
Proof. 1. Let αi1 , ..., αin be n independent coordinates of α. We observe that we
can write M = M ′U as in Corollary 3.2.9, where M ′ ∈ Fk×nqm is a generator of
the Gabidulin code Gn,k((αi1 , ..., αin)), in the form (3.9), and U ∈ Fn×Nq . From
Corollary 3.2.9, we have
dRmin(〈M〉Fqm ) = min{dRmin(〈M ′〉Fqm ), rk(U)} = min{n− k + 1, n} = n− k + 1.
2. The first statement follows directly from the Moore matrix structure. It then
follows that
dim(〈M〉Fqm + 〈M ([1])〉Fqm ) = dim(〈M〉Fqm ) + dim(〈M ([1])〉Fqm )
− dim(〈M〉Fqm ∩ 〈M〉([1])Fqm )
= k + 1.
3. The first statement follows from the fact that (x+y)[i] = x[i]+y[i] for any x, y ∈ Fqm .
Therefore the Moore structure is preserved under addition of matrices. For the
second part note that any element a ∈ 〈A〉Fqm has rank at most r and any non-
zero element mi ∈ 〈M〉 has rank at least n − k + 1. The result follows from the
reverse triangle inequality.
4. Since the minimum rank distance of 〈M〉Fqm is d > 1, it follows from (2) that
dim
(〈M〉Fqm + 〈M ([1])〉Fqm) = k+ 1. Then, from (1) we obtain that the minimum
rank distance of 〈M〉Fqm + 〈M ([1])〉Fqm is n− (k + 1) + 1 = d− 1.
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5. Let E′ ∈ FN×sq be such that [E | E′] has full rank. Then, [E | E′] is an isometry,
and so 〈M [E | E′]〉Fqm has minimum rank distance d. Removing the last s columns
gives 〈ME〉Fqm = 〈M〉FqmE, which can only decrease the rank by at most s.
We state the main result of Sheekey and Lunardon, which is the construction of the
generalized twisted Gabidulin code.
Theorem 3.2.11. [70, 50] Let k ≤ n ≤ m, (s,m) = 1, h ∈ Z≥0, and α0, . . . , αn−1 ∈ Fqm
be independent over Fq. Suppose that η ∈ Fqm satisfies Nqsm/qs(η) 6= (−1)mk, and define
the set
Hk,s(η, h) = {a0x+ a1x[s] + . . .+ ak−1x[s(k−1)] + ηa[h]0 x[sk] | ai ∈ Fqm}.
The code
Ck,s(η, h) = {(f(α0), f(α1), . . . , f(αn−1)) | f ∈ Hk,s(η, h)}
is an MRD code.
In general, Ck,s(η, h) is only Fq-linear. However, when η = 0 we recover the standard
definition of generalized Gabidulin codes and when h = 0, we obtain a family of codes
which are linear over Fqm and not generalized Gabidulin codes. In this case, one can
obtain a generator matrix by evaluating the polynomials x+ηx[sk], x[s], . . . , x[s(k−1)] since
they form a basis for Ck,s(η, 0) over Fqm . We can observe, then, that Ck,s(η, 0) always
contains a generalized Gabidulin code of dimension k − 1 as a subcode.
3.2.2 New MRD Codes
In this section, we will focus only on Fqm-linear rank metric codes in Fnqm and so we drop
the descriptor, Fqm-linear, and simply refer to them as MRD codes. We will present some
preliminary results and observations, followed by constructions of new MRD codes, for
small parameters. In this work we want to give new conditions for MRD codes and in
particular retrieve an algebraic condition allowing one to efficiently determine if a given
code is a generalized Gabidulin code. This will allow us to test if new constructions are
generalized Gabidulin codes, or not. For this we will derive some properties for both
MRD and generalized Gabidulin codes.
The following criterion for MRD codes was already given in [26]:
Proposition 3.2.12. Let H ∈ F(n−k)×nqm be a parity check matrix of a rank metric code
C ⊆ Fnqm . Then C is an MRD code if and only if
rk(V HT ) = n− k,
for all V ∈ Mat(n−k)×n(Fq) with rk(V ) = n− k.
This criterion is formulated with respect to the parity check matrix of a linear code.
We can easily derive a criterion for the generator matrix of MRD codes from this:
30
Corollary 3.2.13. Let G ∈ Fk×nqm be a generator matrix of a rank-metric code C ⊆ Fnqm .
Then C is an MRD code if and only if
rk(V GT ) = k
for all V ∈ Matk×n(Fq), with rk(V ) = k.
Proof. The generator matrix, G, of C is a parity check matrix of the dual code C⊥ ⊆ Fnqm
of dimension n − k. It follows from Proposition 3.2.12 that C⊥ is an MRD code if and
only if rk(V GT ) = k for all V ∈ Fk×nq with rk(V ) = k. From Proposition 3.2.7, C is
MRD if and only if C⊥ is MRD. The statement follows.
Lemma 3.2.14. Any generator matrix G ∈ Fk×nqm of an MRD code C ⊆ Fnqm of dimension
k has only non-zero maximal minors.
Proof. Let V = [ Ik | 0 ] ∈ Fk×nq . Then det(V GT ) is the maximal minor of G involving
the first k columns. By Corollary 3.2.13, this minor is non-zero. Similarly, we can create
all other maximal minors of G by multiplication by some other V ∈ Matk×n(Fq) of rank
k. Thus, by Corollary 3.2.13 we obtain the statement of the lemma.
Theorem 3.2.15. Let G ∈ Fk×nqm be a generator matrix of a rank-metric code C ⊆ Fnqm .
Then C is an MRD code if and only if for every σ ∈ GLn(Fq), each maximal minor of
Gσ is non-zero.
Proof. We first prove the converse direction. For this, let C be an MRD code. Then all
elements in the orbit of C under GLn(Fq) are also MRD codes. Since GLn(Fq) acts on
the columns of any generator matrix of C, together with Lemma 3.2.14, we obtain that
all maximal minors of any element of the form Gσ must be non-zero.
For the other direction, let C be a non-MRD code, so that there exists a non-zero
codeword, c ∈ C, of rank at most n− k. Then, there exists σ ∈ GLn(Fq) such that
cσ =
(
0 . . . 0 ∗ . . . ∗ ) ,
where the first k coordinates are 0 and the last n− k coordinates belong to Fqm . This in
turn implies that there exists a generator matrix of Cσ with cσ as a row. Then, the first
maximal minor of any generator matrix for Cσ will must be zero contradicting that C is
an MRD code.
As a remark, we note that similar result is known in the Hamming metric. A code,
C, in the Hamming metric is MDS if and only if every minor of a generator matrix for C
is non-zero.
In order to be able to work with this criterion, we can slightly simplify it as follows.
For this, denote by UT∗n(Fq) the subgroup of GLn(Fq) of upper triangular matrices with
all ones on the diagonal.
Corollary 3.2.16. Let G ∈ Fk×nqm be a generator matrix of a rank-metric code C ⊆ Fnqm .
Then C is an MRD code if and only if for any σ ∈ UT∗n(Fq), every maximal minor of Gσ
is non-zero.
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Proof. Note that UT∗n(Fq), together with the invertible diagonal matrices and the per-
mutation matrices in GLn(Fq) generate the entire general linear group GLn(Fq). The
action of the diagonal matrices multiplies the maximal minors of the generator matrix
by a non-zero scalar, the action of the permutation matrices at most changes the sign of
the maximal minors. Hence, these two subgroups do not change the non-zeroness of the
maximal minors. Thus, we only need to consider the action of UT∗n(Fq).
The following lemma generalizes Corollary 3.1.9.
Lemma 3.2.17. Let (s,m) = 1 and v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Fnqm be of rank r over Fq. Then
v,v([s]), . . . ,v([s(r−1)]) are linearly independent over Fqm .
Proof. Assume that v,v([s]), . . . ,v([s(r−1)]) are not linearly independent over Fqm , so that
that there exist λ0, . . . , λr−1 ∈ Fqm , at least one λi 6= 0, such that
r−1∑
i=0
λiv
([is]) = 0.
Then the qs-linearized polynomial
p(x) =
r−1∑
i=0
λix
[si] =
r−1∑
i=0
λix
(qs)i ∈ Fqms [x],
has v1, . . . , vn as roots. Since p is Fqs-linearized, all elements of the vector space 〈v1, . . . , vn〉Fqs
are also roots. Since 〈v1, . . . , vn〉Fq has dimension r, by [45, Lemma 4.3] also 〈v1, . . . , vn〉Fqs
has dimension r. Hence, there are qrs roots of p in Fqms . Hence p must have degree at
least qrs, which is a contradiction.
The following straight-forward lemma is needed to prove Lemma 3.2.19.
Lemma 3.2.18. Let (s,m) = 1 and w1, . . . ,wk ∈ Fnqm be linearly independent over Fqm .
Then w([s])1 , . . . ,w
([s])
k ∈ Fnqm are also linearly independent over Fqm
Proof. Assume that w([s])1 , . . . ,w
([s])
k are not linearly independent, so that there exist
λ1, . . . , λk ∈ Fqm with
k∑
i=1
λiw
([s])
i = 0⇔
(
k∑
i=1
λ
[−s]
i wi
)([s])
= 0⇔
k∑
i=1
λ
[−s]
i wi = 0.
Thus, the vectors w1, . . . ,wk are not linearly independent, a contradiction.
The following result is a generalization of [35, Theorem 1].
Lemma 3.2.19. Let (s,m) = 1 and W ⊂ Fnqm be a subspace of dimension k ≤ n
satisfying W ([s]) = W . Then W has a generator matrix in Fk×nq . In particular, W has a
basis of elements of rank one over Fq.
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Proof. If {w1, ...,wk} ⊂ Fnqm , is a basis for W , then by Lemma 3.2.18 {w([s])1 , ...,w([s])k }
is also a basis of W . Then, there exists an A ∈ GLk(Fqm) such that
w
[s]
1,1 w
[s]
1,2 . . . w
[s]
1,n
w
[s]
2,1 w
[s]
2,2 . . . w
[s]
2,n
...
w
[s]
k,1 w
[s]
k,2 . . . w
[s]
k,n
 = A

w1,1 w1,2 . . . w1,n
w2,1 w2,2 . . . w2,n
...
wk,1 wk,2 . . . wk,n
 .
Since the rightmost matrix has rank k, there exists a set of k linearly independent (over
Fqm) columns. Without loss of generality, assume that the first k columns are linearly
independent. Thus, the submatrix W1 = (wi,j)ki,j=1 is invertible (and therefore W
([s])
1 is
also invertible by Lemma 3.2.18), and so we can solve
A = W
([s])
1 W
−1
1 .
Define W2 = (wi,j)ki=1
n
j=k+1. Then we have,
W
([s])
2 = W
([s])
1 W
−1
1 W2.
If we apply the coordinate-wise Frobenius map s times on both sides and use Lemma
3.1.8, we obtain,
W
([2s])
2 = W
([2s])
1 (W
−1
1 )
([s])W
([s])
2
= W
([2s])
1 (W
([s])
1 )
−1W ([s])1 W
−1
1 W2
= W
([2s])
1 W
−1
1 W2.
Then, we have
W
([2s])
1 (W
−1
1 )
([s])W
([s])
2 = W
([2s])
1 W
−1
1 W2.
Since W ([2s])1 is invertible, we obtain
(W−11 W2)
([s]) = W−11 W2,
and therefore we must have that W−11 W2 has only entries in Fq, by Lemma 3.2.5. There-
fore, a generator matrix for W can be expressed as W−11 [W1 | W2] = [Ik | W−11 W2] ∈
Fk×nq .
Proposition 3.2.20. Let (s,m) = 1 and suppose that C ⊂ Fnqm is a linear code of
dimension k ≥ 2 and minimum rank distance at least k. If dim(C ∩ C[s]) = k − 1 (this
automatically implies that k < n), then there exists a generator matrix for C of the form,
G∗ =

g1 g2 . . . gn
g
[s]
1 g
[s]
2 . . . g
[s]
n
...
g
[s(k−1)]
1 g
[s(k−1)]
2 . . . g
[s(k−1)]
n
 ,
where g1, . . . , gn ∈ Fqm .
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Proof. We prove this inductively on k. First assume that k = 2. Then dim(C∩C([s])) = 1,
i.e. there exists g′ ∈ C such that C ∩ C([s]) = 〈g′〉Fqm . Since g′ ∈ C([s]), we get that
g′([−s]) ∈ C. The minimum rank distance of C is at least k = 2, i.e. the rank of g′([−s])
over Fq is at least 2. Then, by Lemma 3.2.17, g′([−s]) and g′ are linearly independent.
Hence they form a basis of C and we can rename g = g′([−s]) to write a generator matrix
as
G∗ =
(
g
g[s]
)
.
We now explain the induction step (k − 1) → k. Let W = C ∩ C([s]). We know from
Lemma 3.2.19 that W ([s]) 6= W , because the minimum rank distance of C is at least
k ≥ 2. Since W,W ([s]) ⊂ C([s]), both with codimension 1, we get 〈W,W ([s])〉Fqm = C([s]).
Then,
dim(W ∩W ([s])) = dim(W ) + dim(W ([s]))− dim(W +W ([s])) = 2(k − 1)− k = k − 2.
Furthermore, since W ⊂ C, the minimum rank distance of W is at least k. Therefore, W
satisfies the conditions of the induction hypothesis, and so we can express W in terms of
some basis of the form
{w,w([s]), . . . ,w([s(k−2)])}.
Hence, {w,w([s]), . . . ,w([s(k−2)])} ∈ C and thus {w([s]),w([2s]), . . . ,w([s(k−1)])} ∈ C([s]).
On the other hand, w ∈ W ⊂ C([s]), i.e. {w,w([s]), . . . ,w([s(k−1)])} ∈ C([s]). By Lemma
3.2.17 this set is linearly independent, i.e. it is a basis of C([s]). This in turn implies that
{w([−s]),w,w([s]), . . . ,w([s(k−2)])} is a basis of C. Define g = w[−s], and we obtain that
{g, g([s]), . . . , g([s(k−1)])} is a basis of C.
Lemma 3.2.21. Let C be a linear MRD code of dimension k < n with generator matrix
G∗ =

g1 g2 . . . gn
g
[s]
1 g
[s]
2 . . . g
[s]
n
...
g
[s(k−1)]
1 g
[s(k−1)]
2 . . . g
[s(k−1)]
n
 .
Then g1, . . . , gn are linearly independent over Fq.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Assume, without loss of generality, that g1 is in
〈g2, ..., gn〉Fq , that is, that there exist λ2, . . . , λn ∈ Fq with g1 =
∑n
i=2 λigi. Then
g
[j]
1 =
(
n∑
i=2
λigi
)[j]
=
n∑
i=2
λ
[j]
i g
[j]
i =
n∑
i=2
λig
[j]
i .
Therefore, g[j]1 ∈ 〈g[j]2 , . . . , g[j]n 〉Fq for any j ∈ N. Hence there exists σ ∈ GLn(Fq) such
that the first column of G∗σ is zero. It follows from Theorem 3.2.15 that C is then not
an MRD code.
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Theorem 3.2.22. If C ⊆ Fnqm is a linear MRD code of dimension k and dim(C ∩ C[s]) =
k − 1, then C is a generalized Gabidulin code.
Proof. If k ≤ (n + 1)/2, then the minimum distance of C is at least k. Then it follows
from Proposition 3.2.20 that C has a generator matrix of the form
G∗ =

g1 g2 . . . gn
g
[s]
1 g
[s]
2 . . . g
[s]
n
...
g
[s(k−1)]
1 g
[s(k−1)]
2 . . . g
[s(k−1)]
n
 .
It follows from Lemma 3.2.21 that the gi are linearly independent over Fq. This is the
definition of a generalized Gabidulin code.
If k > (n+ 1)/2, then it follows from Proposition 3.2.7 that the dual code C⊥ ⊆ Fnqm
has dimension n − k and minimum distance k + 1 > n − k, i.e. we can use Proposition
3.2.20 and Lemma 3.2.21 as before to show that C⊥ is a generalized Gabidulin code.
Since the dual of a generalized Gabidulin code is again a generalized Gabidulin code, the
statement follows.
Corollary 3.2.23. Let C be an MRD code which is not a generalized Gabidulin code.
Then, C is not semi-linearly equivalent to a generalized Gabidulin code.
Proof. First, we note that generalized Gabidulin codes are closed under semi-linear isome-
tries. Therefore, if a code is not equal to a generalized Gabidulin, then it is also not
semi-linearly equivalent to one.
We are now in a position to construct new MRD codes which are not semi-linearly
isometric to generalized Gabidulin codes.
Theorem 3.2.24. All linear MRD codes in Fnqm of dimension k = 1 or k = n − 1 are
Gabidulin codes.
Proof. Let C ⊆ Fnqm be an MRD code of dimension 1. Then the minimum rank distance
is n and it can be generated by one vector in Fnqm . Clearly this vector needs to have only
entries that are linearly independent over Fq, thus it is a Gabidulin code.
Since the dual of a Gabidulin code is again a Gabidulin code (see Proposition 3.2.7),
the statement for codes of dimension n− 1 follows.
From here, we easily obtain the following:
Corollary 3.2.25. All linear MRD codes of length n ∈ {1, 2, 3} are Gabidulin codes.
Lemma 3.2.26. Any MRD code C ⊆ Fnqm of dimension k has a generator matrix G ∈
Fk×nqm in systematic form,
G = [ Ik | ∗ ] .
Moreover, all entries of ∗ are from Fqm \ Fq.
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Proof. Assume that the generator matrix of C in reduced row echelon form has a row with
pivot in column i > k. Then this row vector has at most n − k many non-zero entries,
which contradicts the minimum rank distance n− k+ 1 of C. Therefore, all pivots are in
columns 1, . . . , k, which proves the first statement. The second statement follows again
from the minimum rank distance n − k + 1 of the code, because every codeword needs
to have at least n− k entries from Fqm \ Fq.
In the first case not covered by Theorem 3.2.24, n = m = 4, k = 2 and q = 2, we can
get the following statement, which was also proven, with quite different tools, in [70].
Proposition 3.2.27. All linear MRD codes in F424 are Gabidulin codes.
Proof. The case for codes of dimension k = 1 or k = 3 follows from Theorem 3.2.24. It
remains to show the case k = 2. Then by Lemma 3.2.26 there exists a generator matrix
of the form
G =
(
1 0 a b
0 1 c d
)
,
with a, b, c, d ∈ F24 \ F2. For G to generate an MRD code, by Theorem 3.2.15 we have
that
G

1 u1 u2 u3
0 1 u4 u5
0 0 1 u6
0 0 0 1
 = ( 1 u1 u2 + a u3 + au6 + b0 1 u4 + c u5 + cu6 + d
)
needs to have only non-zero maximal minors for u1, . . . , u6 ∈ F2. Thus we get the
following inequations:
1 6= 0
u4 + c 6= 0
u5 + cu6 + d 6= 0
(u2 + a)− u1(u4 + c) 6= 0
(u3 + au6 + b)− u1(u5 + cu6 + d) 6= 0
(u2 + a)(u5 + cu6 + d)− (u4 + c)(u3 + au6 + b) 6= 0
Clearly the first inequation is always true; as is the second, since u4 ∈ F2 and c /∈ F2.
For G not to generate a Gabidulin code we need, from Theorem 3.2.22, that
rk

1 0 a b
0 1 c d
1 0 a2 b2
0 1 c2 d2
 6= 3.
Since a, b, c, d 6∈ F2 the rank of the above matrix is clearly at least 3. If the rank is equal
to 4, then
(a2 − a)(d2 − d)− (b2 − b)(c2 − c) 6= 0.
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Thus, including this with the equations we obtained earlier, we need to check that there
is no solution to the system of inequations,
u5 + cu6 + d 6= 0
(u2 + a)− u1(u4 + c) 6= 0
(u3 + au6 + b)− u1(u5 + cu6 + d) 6= 0
(u2 + a)(u5 + cu6 + d)− (u4 + c)(u3 + au6 + b) 6= 0
(a2 − a)(d2 − d)− (b2 − b)(c2 − c) 6= 0
for any u1, . . . , u6 ∈ F2. With the help of a computer program one can check that there
exist no solutions for a, b, c, d ∈ F24\F2 for the above system of inequations.
We can therefore try to construct non-Gabidulin MRD codes for q > 2 and m ≥ 4.
Theorem 3.2.28. Let m > 4, α ∈ Fqm a primitive element, and γ ∈ Fq a quadratic
non-residue in Fq such that γ 6= (α[s] + α)2 for any 0 < s < m with (s,m) = 1. Then
G =
(
1 0 α α2
0 1 α2 γα
)
is a generator matrix of an MRD code C ⊆ F4qm of dimension k = 2 that is not a
generalized Gabidulin code.
Proof. First we prove that C is an MRD code. For this, we use Corollary 3.2.16. Note
that
UT∗4(Fq) =


1 u1 u2 u3
0 1 u4 u5
0 0 1 u6
0 0 0 1
 | u1, . . . , u6 ∈ Fq
 ,
and
G

1 u1 u2 u3
0 1 u4 u5
0 0 1 u6
0 0 0 1
 = ( 1 u1 u2 + α u3 + u6α+ α20 1 u4 + α2 u5 + u6α2 + γα
)
.
We need to show that all maximal minors of this matrix are non-zero for any values of
u1, . . . , u6. This gives the inequations:
1 6= 0
u4 + α
2 6= 0
u5 + α
2u6 + γα 6= 0
(u2 + α)− u1(u4 + α2) 6= 0
(u3 + αu6 + α
2)− u1(u5 + α2u6 + γα) 6= 0
(u2 + α)(u5 + α
2u6 + γα)− (u4 + α2)(u3 + αu6 + α2) 6= 0
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One can easily see that the first four inequations are always true, since all ui are in Fq.
We can rewrite the fifth inequation as
(u1u5 − u3) + (u1γ − u6)α+ (u1u6 − 1)α2 6= 0.
If the last term is zero then u1 = u−16 . But then u1γ−u6 = u−16 (γ−u26) 6= 0 because γ is
a quadratic non-residue. Thus, in this case, the middle term of the above sum does not
vanish, and so the inequation is always true. Lastly we can rewrite the sixth inequation
as
(u2u5 − u3u4) + (u2γ + u5 − u4u6)α+ (u2u6 + γ − u4 − u3)α2 − α4 6= 0.
This is always true, since the minimal polynomial of α has degreem > 4 and u1, . . . , u6, γ ∈
Fq, so nothing can cancel out the α4-term.
It remains to prove that C is not a generalized Gabidulin code. For this we use
Theorem 3.2.22 and compute
rk
(
G
G[s]
)
= rk

1 0 α α2
0 1 α2 γα
1 0 α[s] α2[s]
0 1 α2[s] γα[s]

= rk

1 0 α α2
0 1 α2 γα
0 0 α[s] − α α2[s] − α2
0 0 α2[s] − α2 γ(α[s] − α)
 ,
for any s with gcd(s,m) = 1. Since α 6∈ Fq this rank cannot be equal to 2, by Lemma
3.2.5. Hence, C is Gabidulin if and only if the determinant of the lower right submatrix
from above is zero, i.e. if and only if
γ(α[s] − α)2 − (α2[s] − α2)2 = 0
⇔ γ(α[s] − α)2 = (α2[s] − α2)2
⇔ γ(α[s] − α)2 = (α[s] − α)2(α[s] + α)2
⇔ γ = (α[s] + α)2.
This is not possible, due to the conditions on γ, which implies that C is not a generalized
Gabidulin code.
Example 3.2.29. Let q = 3,m = 5 and α a root of x5 + 2x2 + x+ 1. Then γ = 2 is a
quadratic non-residue in F35 and the code with generator matrix
G =
(
1 0 α α2
0 1 α2 2α
)
is an MRD code which is not a generalized Gabidulin code.
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In Theorem 3.2.28, we were restricted to the case m > 4. We can find analog
constructions for m = 4, as shown in the following examples. The proofs that these
examples are also non-Gabidulin MRD codes is analogous to the one of Theorem 3.2.28,
but when checking if the maximal minor of G · UT∗n(Fq) involving the third and fourth
column is non-zero we cannot use the argument that the minimal polynomial m(x) of
α has degree at least 4. Instead we need to write α4 modulo m(x) and show that the
minor remains non-zero.
Example 3.2.30. Let q = 3,m = 4, and α a root of x4 − x3 − 1. Then γ = 2 is a
quadratic non-residue in F3 and it fulfills the conditions that γ 6= (α[s] + α)2 for any
0 < s < m with gcd(s,m) = 1. Now the code with generator matrix
G =
(
1 0 α α2
0 1 α2 2α
)
is an MRD but not a generalized Gabidulin code. To show that it is an MRD code we
need to prove that the before mentioned minor is non-zero, i.e. that
(u2u5 − u3u4) + (2u2 + u5 − u4u6)α+ (u2u6 + 2− u4 − u3)α2 − α4
⇐⇒ (u2u5 − u3u4 − 1) + (2u2 + u5 − u4u6)α+ (u2u6 + 2− u4 − u3)α2 − α3
is non-zero for any u1, . . . , u6 ∈ Fq. This is clearly the case since nothing can cancel out
the α3-term.
Note that in the previous example we could have chosen any minimal polynomial of
α that involves a non-zero term of order 3 (and a suitable γ). The same proof would
then show that the generated code is MRD but not a generalized Gabidulin code.
We conclude with a final example over F5. A generalization for other values of q is
straightforward.
Example 3.2.31. Let q = 5,m = 4, and α a root of x4 + x3 + x2 + x+ 3. Then γ = 2
is a quadratic non-residue in F5 and it fulfills the conditions that γ 6= (α[s] +α)2 for any
0 < s < m with gcd(s,m) = 1. Now the code with generator matrix
G =
(
1 0 α α2
0 1 α2 2α
)
is an MRD but not a generalized Gabidulin code. To show that it is an MRD code we
need to prove that the before mentioned minor is non-zero, i.e. that
(u2u5 − u3u4) + (u2γ + u5 − u4u6)α+ (u2u6 + γ − u4 − u3)α2 − α4
⇔ (u2u5 − u3u4 + 2) + (u2γ + u5 − u4u6 + 4)α+ (u2u6 + γ − u4 − u3 + 4)α2 + 4α3
is non-zero for any u1, . . . , u6 ∈ Fq. This is clearly the case since nothing can cancel out
the 4α3-term.
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From Corollary 3.2.23, these codes constructed are not semi-linearly equivalent to
a generalized Gabidulin code. Recall from Theorem 3.1.16 that there are still other
isometries of the rank metric. It is not so easy, on the other hand, to determine if the
codes we constructed are sub-linearly equivalent to generalized twisted Gabidulin codes.
Also, we note that is quite difficult to construct codes for larger values of n, k as the
number of inequations grows rapidly. Nevertheless, these preliminary results indicate
there may be other interesting classes of linear MRD codes that have not been explicitly
constructed.
3.2.3 LRPC Codes
Low rank parity check (LRPC) codes were presented in [31] as a rank-metric analog to
low density parity check (LDPC) codes in the Hamming metric.
Definition 3.2.32. Let F ⊂ Fqm be an Fq-subspace of dimension f . A code will be
called a low rank parity check code with support F if there exists a parity check matrix
such that all entries belong to F .
In an analogous way to LDPC codes, the structure of the parity check matrix makes
these codes amenable to syndrome decoding. Let H ∈ F (n−k)×n be a parity check matrix
for an LDPC code with support F = 〈F1, . . . , Ff 〉Fq , and suppose that y = x + e is a
received vector with rk(e) = r. Let E1, . . . , Er be a basis for suppvs(e). Then each
coordinate of
s = HyT = HeT =
(
n∑
i=1
H1,iei, . . . ,
n∑
i=1
Hn−k,iei
)T
has entries which belong to the product space 〈E.F 〉 = 〈EiFj〉Fq . Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn−k〉Fq
for coordinate si of s, and suppose that S = 〈E.F 〉.
Consider
E′ =
d⋂
i=1
F−1i S. (3.11)
For each i = 1, . . . , f , F−1i S necessarily contains Ej for j = 1, . . . , r and so E ⊂ F−1i S.
Therefore, E ⊆ E′. It shown in [31] that with high probability we have
suppvs(e) =
d⋂
i=1
F−1i S.
We can then write down equations for the error coordinates,
ei =
r∑
j=1
eijEj ,
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for each coordinate ei of e. Each coordinate of s belongs to the space 〈E.F 〉 which has
spanning set {EiFj}ri=1 fj=1. We can write each coordinate s` of s as
s` =
f∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
eijEiFj ,
which gives a system of rf variables and n− k equations.
Theorem 3.2.33 ([31]). Let F ⊂ E be a subspace of dimension f , and H ∈ F (n−k)×n a
parity check matrix for an LRPC code with support F . Then, we can decode a random
error e of rank r such that rf ≤ n−k with failure probability q−(n−k+1−rf) and complexity
r2(4f2m+ n2).
We will make several remarks about rank based cryptosystems based on LRPC codes
at the end of Chapter 5.
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Chapter 4
Coding-Based Cryptosystems
McEliece first proposed a cryptographic scheme based on ideas in coding theory in 1978.
Despite having efficient encryption and decryption processes, at the time, it was consid-
ered infeasible for practical purposes and remained a theoretical curiosity. One of the
problems is that the system requires a large public key size relative to number theoretic
based cryptosystems with the same practical level of security. There has been a signifi-
cant amount of work on reducing the public key size in recent years. The impetus behind
this is the result of Shor, which would allow one to break RSA is polynomial time on
a quantum computer [71]. Shortly after, Chuang et al. [13] generalized the algorithm
to solve the DLP in elliptic curve groups, effectively breaking ECC with a quantum
computer. However, it was shown in [20] that the proposal by McEliece resists Shor’s
algorithm and more generally algorithms based on coset sampling. These two results
together have motivated a great deal of interest in post-quantum cryptography and in
particular improvements in algorithms solving the general syndrome decoding problem
[11, 8]. On modern computers and with new techniques, the original parameters pro-
posed by McEliece have been found to be too small to be secure, but the idea to use
Goppa codes has so far resisted structural attacks. Other codes, such as LDPC and
Reed-Solomon codes have, on the other hand, been shown to be structurally insecure.
In Section 4.1 we give a brief introduction to the McEliece cryptosystem, which is the
foundation for coding based cryptography. We also briefly outline the information set
decoding attack. Section 4.2 outlines some of the most important rank-based cryptosys-
tems. The first such, the GPT cryptosystem, was proposed by Gabidulin et al. in [28]
and a generalization given later by Loidreau in [49] called the GGPT cryptosystem is
given in Subsection 4.2.1. In Subsection 4.2.2, Overbeck’s attack on the GPT cryptosys-
tem is explained. The attack was used to cryptanalyze many of the existing variants in
the literature, and several variants of the GGPT cryptosystem were proposed specifically
to resist the attack. Another variant designed to resist Overbeck’s attack called the col-
umn scrambler variant was proposed Gabidulin et al. [29] and is presented in Subsection
4.2.4.
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4.1 McEliece Cryptosystem
Many constructions for linear codes exist and often their parameters can be found or at
least bounded using a variety of techniques. However, the class of codes for which efficient
decoding algorithms exist is much smaller; it is because the problem of decoding is known
to be significantly difficult. Let H ∈ F(n−k)×nq be a matrix and let t ∈ {0, . . . , n}. The
syndrome decoding problem, SDq(H, t, s), is to determine if there exists an x ∈ Fnq such
that HxT = s and wtH(x) = t. Suppose that t is the weight of a correctable error, e, of a
code, C, with parity check matrix H. Let H ′ be a parity check matrix for 〈H〉⊥Fq + 〈e〉Fq .
Then the search version of SDq(H ′, t,0) is equivalent to the problem of minimum distance
decoding in 〈H〉⊥Fq . Berlekamp et al. studied this problem in [7], and proved the following
important result.
Theorem 4.1.1. Let H ∈ F(n−k)×nqm be a random matrix of full rank and t ∈ {0, . . . , n}.
The problem SDq(H, t, s) is NP-complete.
As a consequence of Theorem 4.1.1, efficient solutions exist mainly for special cases of
the SD problem and tend to be for codes which are quite structured. Without knowledge
of this structure, an attacker would have to resort to using generic attacks which would be
relatively inefficient since the general problem isNP-complete. The most efficient generic
attacks against the syndrome decoding problem are based on the idea of information set
decoding [63].
We note that there are subproblems of the syndrome decoding problem which can be
solved in polynomial time. For instance, if t = 0 the solution is trivial, and even if t = 1
a solution can be found in polynomial time by linear algebra.
The McEliece cryptosystem is fairly straight-forward.
Definition 4.1.2. Let G ∈ GLk(Fq) be a generator matrix of a code capable of correcting
t errors, and dec a decoding algorithm with respect to G. Furthermore, choose matrices
S ∈ GLk(Fq) and pi ∈ Sn ↪→ GLn(Fq). The public key for the system will be given by
(κpub, t), where
κpub = SGpi,
and the private key by
κpvt = (S, pi, dec).
Such a system is called a McEliece cryptosystem.
Suppose that Bob wants to send a message m ∈ Fkq to Alice. Using Alice’s public
key, Bob chooses a random error e of weight at most t, and sends
y = mSGpi + e.
Alice then computes ypi−1 = mSG+ epi−1. Since the weight of epi−1 is unchanged by a
permutation matrix, this error also has weight at most t. Therefore, Alice can decode to
dec(ypi−1) = mS.
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Inverting S, Alice can then obtain m.
The security is based on the assumption that SGpi will appear as a random matrix to
an eavesdropper. Without knowledge of the components of the private key, it will then
be difficult to break the system. An attack on a PKC cryptosystem has one of two forms.
The first are structural attacks–those which attempt to recover some information about
the private key from the public key–and generic attacks–those which attempt to solve
the SD problem. Sidel’nikov and Shestakov, for instance, managed to break the McEliece
cryptosystem when the underlying code is Reed-Solomon by exploiting their predictable
structure [72]. On the other hand, information set decoding is a generic attack–it can be
applied to an arbitrary linear code.
Generic attacks provide an upper bound for the security of a cryptosystem. As a
consequence, they also bound the parameters required for these systems to be considered
secure. Unfortunately, because of the relative efficiency of generic attacks against the
syndrome decoding problem, the parameters of McEliece cryptosystems must be quite
large.
Prange in [63] introduced the idea of information set decoding upon which the fastest
algorithms for solving the SD problem are based. The idea is relatively straight forward.
Let G ∈ Fk×nq be a generator matrix for a code capable of correcting t errors. Given an
error, e ∈ Fnq , if one can guess k coordinates of e which are 0, then the message can be
recovered from the submatrix of G whose columns correspond to the zero coordinates of
e. There have been several refinements of this idea an improvements in algorithms with
the best known algorithm for solving the SD problem due to Becker et al. achieving a
complexity of approximately 2n/20 [25, 21, 4].
4.2 Cryptosystems Based on Rank Metric Codes
4.2.1 GPT and GGPT Cryptosystem
Definition 4.2.1. Let S ∈ GLk(Fqm), G ∈ Fk×nqm be a generator matrix of a Gabidulin
code, say Gabn,k(α), capable of correcting t′ errors, and X ∈ Fk×nqm be a matrix of column
rank t < t′. Let
Gpub = SG+X. (4.1)
A GPT cryptosystem is one in which the public key is given by the pair
κpub = (Gpub, t
′ − t), (4.2)
and the private key is given by
κpvt = (G,S). (4.3)
An encryption of a message m ∈ Fkqm is given by
mGpub + e = mSG+mX + e,
where e ∈ Fnqm is a randomly chosen vector of rank at most t′ − t. The product mS can
be recovered from a decoding algorithm for Gabn,k(α) because all elements of 〈X〉Fqm
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have weight at most t. Specifically, if wtR(e) ≤ t′ − t,
wtR(mX + e) ≤ wtR(mX) + wtR(e) ≤ t′.
Inverting S, the messagem can then be recovered. We will call the elements of the form
mX the designed error associated with the encryption of m, and X the designed error
matrix.
In [64, 49] the authors consider an alternative version which we call the generalized
GPT (GGPT) cryptosystem. This system uses a public matrix of the form
Gˆpub = S[X | G]σ ∈ Fk×(n+tˆ)qm , (4.4)
where G ∈ Fk×nqm is a generator matrix for a Gabidulin code, X ∈ Fk×tˆqm , S ∈ GLk(Fqm),
and σ ∈ GLn+tˆ(Fq). The public key is given by
κpub = (Gˆpub, t
′), (4.5)
and the private key is given by
κpvt = (G,S, σ). (4.6)
In the GGPT cryptosystem, an encryption of m ∈ Fkqm is given by
mGˆ+ e,
with rk(e) ≤ t′. To recover m, one first computes
(mGˆ+ e)σ−1,
and then ignores the first tˆ coordinates. The last n coordinates of eσ−1 have weight at
most t′, and therefore decoding the last n coordinates with respect to G, one obtains
mS, and by applying S−1, the message m can be recovered.
4.2.2 Overbeck’s Attack
We will describe Overbeck’s attack from [62] for the case of the GGPT cryptosystem;
the attack for the GPT case is analogous. Let G ∈ Fk×nqm be a generator matrix for the
Gabidulin code, Gabn,k(α) and X a matrix of rank tˆ. The first step in Overbeck’s attack
is to consider the extended matrix
Gext =

S[X | G]σ
(S[X | G]σ)([1])
...
(S[X | G]σ)([n−k−1])
 = S˜

X G
X([1]) G([1])
...
...
X([n−k−1]) G([n−k−1])
σ,
where S˜ = diag(S, S([1]), . . . , S([n−k−1])) is a block diagonal matrix. Since the n right-
most columns of Gextσ−1 span the Gabidulin code Gabn,n−1(α), the matrix can be
brought into the form of
G′ext = S˜
′
(
X∗ G∗
X∗∗ 0
)
σ, (4.7)
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by some suitable row transformation, where X∗ ∈ F(n−1)×tˆqm , G∗ ∈ F(n−1)×nqm is a generator
matrix of Gabn,n−1(α), and X∗∗ ∈ F(k−1)(n−k−1)×tˆqm . If X∗∗ has rank tˆ, then any element
of 〈G′ext〉⊥ = 〈Gext〉⊥ has the form [0 | h](σ−1)T , where h ∈ Gabn,n−1(α)⊥.
Because (σ−1)T is an isometry, the vector [0 | h](σ−1)T has rank n. Therefore, one
can find a ρ ∈ GLn+tˆ(Fq) and h∗ ∈ Fnqm such that
[0 | h](σ−1)T = [0 | h∗]ρ.
Any such ρ must be of the form
ρ =
(
A B
0 C
)
(σ−1)T ,
where A ∈ GLtˆ(Fq), B ∈ Ftˆ×nq , and C ∈ GLn(Fq). We can then observe that
S[X | G]σρT = [SXAT + SGBT | SGCT ].
The matrix SGCT is a generator matrix for a Gabidulin code. For an encrypted mes-
sage, y, we compute yρT and ignore the first tˆ coordinates. Decoding the remaining n
coordinates with respect to SGCT as in Lemma 5.2.1 we can decrypt the message.
4.2.3 GGPT Variants
Overbeck’s attack succeeds because we can recover a one-dimensional space as the kernel
of G′ext, from (4.7). This space contains the information to reconstruct a suitable un-
scrambling matrix, ρ. If the rank of X∗∗ is smaller than tˆ, then we cannot be guaranteed
that 〈X∗〉Fqm ⊂ 〈X∗∗〉Fqm . The attack can be modified by enumerating over all possible
one-dimensional subspaces of the kernel until an element of the form [0 | h](σ−1)T , for
h ∈ Gabn,n−1(α) is found. The probability of this occurance is that of finding a particular
one-dimensional subspace in a dim
(
〈Gext〉⊥Fqm
)
-dimensional space. If X∗∗ is sufficiently
rank deficient, then this problem becomes computationally infeasible. However, when X
is randomly chosen, it is highly probable that X∗∗ has full rank.
Two strategies emerged in order to exploit this. The first is the strategy considered
in [64] which is to restrict X by some design specifications so that X∗∗ can be forced to
be rank deficient. The second, presented in [49], is to use a randomly chosen designed
error matrix X of low rank, a, and high column rank, tˆ, so that the rank of X∗∗ can be
bounded from above. Note that colrkFq(X) ≤ min{tˆ, am}, and a random matrix of rank
a will achieve this value with high probability. Here, it is assumed that the smaller value
is equal to tˆ (so that colrkFq(X) = tˆ), so that if we choose tˆ > a(n− k), then
Xext =

X
X([1])
...
X([n−k−1])

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has rank at most a(n− k), and column rank tˆ. Therefore,
rk(X∗∗) ≤ rk(Xext) ≤ a(n− k) < tˆ.
We make the following a definition.
Definition 4.2.2. A GGPT system of the form (4.4) where the designed error matrix
is a randomly chosen matrix of rank a and column rank tˆ satisfying a(n− k) < tˆ will be
called the LGGPT variant.
We note that the restriction on tˆ necessitates an increase in the public key size. In
particular, the key size of the LGGPT variant is on the order of (m log q)k(n + tˆ) >
(m log q)k(n+ a(n− k)) bits.
The approach taken in [64] is to algebraically design X so that X∗∗ has a predictable
rank deficit. We will denote the ith row of X by Xi, and g the generating element of the
underlying Gabidulin code. The extended public matrix, can be put in the form
Gpub,ext = S˜

X1 g
...
...
Xk g
([k−1])
X
([1])
k g
([k])
...
...
X
([n−k−1])
k g
([n−2])
X ′ 0
...
...
(X ′)([n−k−2]) 0

,
where
X ′ =

X
([1])
1 −X2
...
X
([1])
k−1 −Xk
 .
Now, if we let X = XMoore +Z where XMoore is a Moore matrix and Z has column rank
a, then we note the Moore component of X will cancel in X ′, leaving
X ′ =

Z
([1])
1 − Z2
...
Z
([1])
k−1 − Zk
 .
Since Z has column rank a, thenX ′ has column rank at most a < tˆ. Since the coordinate-
wise Frobenius map preserves the Grassmann support of X ′ by Lemma 3.1.8, we have
dim
(
n−k−2∑
i=0
〈X ′〉Fqm
)
= a,
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and therefore Overbeck’s attack can not be applied. In the paper where this idea was
proposed, the system was referred to as the smart approach. Therefore, we make the
following definition.
Definition 4.2.3. The GGPT system in which the designed error matrix is of the form
X = XMoore + Z,
where colrkFq(Z) = a < tˆ will be called the SA variant.
Comparing the LGGPT and SA variants, we note that the SA variant should be able
to be designed for significantly smaller parameter choices than the LGGPT system. We
will cryptanalyze both, in Chapter 5.
4.2.4 Column Scrambler Variant
In the original McEliece cryptosystem, the generator matrix is hidden by a row scrambling
matrix and a column permutation matrix. Importantly for the decryption step, the
column permutation matrix is an isometry in the Hamming metric, and hence fixes the
weight of the error vector which is added by the sender. For Gabidulin codes, the semi-
linear isometries of the rank metric do not disguise the structure of the code enough. For
instance, one could recover a decoding algorithm by Lemma 5.2.1.
It was proposed in [29] to use column scrambling matrices which are not isometries,
in order to disguise a secret generator matrix. Of course, not any element of GLn(Fqm)
can be used; it is proposed to take a family, P, of matrices with the property that for
any x ∈ Fnqm and any element P ∈ P, |rk(x) − rk(xP )| is bounded. Then, the error
vector chosen at the sender increases in rank in a predictable way during the decryption
process. A similar idea is considered in [3] for codes in the Hamming metric. We note
that this is not to be confused with the column scrambler variant of Ourivski et al. in
[60], which was broken by Overbeck.
Let G be a Gabidulin code and t be the error correction capability of 〈G〉Fqm . Let
0 < t1 < t be a design parameter and let Pn,t,t1(Fqm) ⊂ GLn(Fqm) be given by
Pn,t,t1 = {[Q1 | Q2]σ |Q1 ∈ Fn×(t−t1)qm , Q2 ∈ Fn×(n−t+t1)q
s.t. rk([Q1 | Q2]) = n, σ ∈ GLn(Fq)}.
For any e ∈ Fnqm of rank at most t1, and P = [Q1 | Q2]σ ∈ Pn,t,t1 we have
rk(eP ) = rk([eQ1 | eQ2]σ)
= rk([eQ1 | eQ2])
≤ rk([eQ1 | 0]) + rk([0 | eQ2])
≤ t− t1 + t1 = t.
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Definition 4.2.4. Let G ∈ Fk×nqm be a t-error correcting Gabidulin code. The column
scrambler (CS) variant is one in which the public key is of the form
κpub = (SGP
−1, t1), (4.8)
for t1 < t, and P ∈ Pn,t,t1 . The private key is given by S−1, G, and P .
The encryption of a message m ∈ Fkqm is performed by simply encoding m with the
public key and adding a random rank error,
mSGP−1 + e,
for a randomly chosen e of rank weight at most t1. Decryption proceeds by applying P ,
yielding κpubP = mSG + eP . Then the receiver decodes with respect to G, obtaining
mS, since rk(eP ) ≤ t. Applying S−1, the receiver can correctly recover m.
Overbeck’s attack fails against the CS variant because the isometry used to disguise
the code is no longer invariant under the coordinate-wise Frobenius map [64]. The
security of this system is therefore based on the idea that the inverse of the matrices in
P will appear random and therefore disguise the matrix G. We will cryptanalyze this
system in Section 4.2.4.
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Chapter 5
Attacks on Rank-based Cryptosystems
The suggestion that codes in the rank metric could be safer to use than codes in the
Hamming metric was motivated by preliminary results concerning combinatorial solutions
for solving the rank syndrome decoding (RSD) problem–the analogous problem to the
SD problem in the rank metric [61, 12]. These results indicated that to solve the RSD
problem was significantly more difficult than the SD problem. As a consequence, one
could potentially make cryptosystems based on codes in the rank metric with smaller
parameters than that which would be feasible in the Hamming metric. The problem
considered is actually a subproblem of the MinRank problem, which is known to be
NP-complete [10]. However, as a sub-problem, the RSD problem is not known to be
NP-complete.
Part of the difficulty in finding efficient algorithms for the RSD problem is that the
structure of errors in the rank metric is not amenable to the same techniques–notably
information set decoding–in which the fastest algorithms for solving the SD problem
are based. As an illustration of why it is believed that the RSD problem is also very
difficult, recall that BHt (0) ⊂ BRt (0). Therefore, if we can solve the rank syndrome
decoding problem for C with respect to the rank distance, this also gives an algorithm
(for the same t) with respect to the Hamming distance. While this would only solve a
subproblem of the SD problem, a polynomial time solution would be surprising.
Rank metric codes were first suggested for use in cryptography by Gabidulin, Para-
manov, and Trejakov (GPT) [28], and since then a number of proposals for systems have
arisen [60, 27, 6]. One key aspect of many of these systems is their use of a Gabidulin
code underpinning the cryptosystem. As a consequence, Gibson proposed the first struc-
tural attack which Overbeck extended, managing to cryptanalyze most of these systems
simultaneously [34, 62]. In light of these structural flaws the GPT cryptosystem in its
original form–as well as many variants–is infeasible, however, in the wake of the attack,
several modifications were made in order to explicity resist Overbeck’s attack [49, 64, 29].
One approach was to consider a generalized GPT (GGPT) system in which one embeds
the structure of the Gabidulin code into a larger space, and therefore can have more
complicated designed error matrices. In this direction, two cryptosystems stand out–one
proposed by Loudreau in [49] and another proposed by Rashwan et al. in [64]. A sepa-
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rate approach in [29] is to use non-isometric transformations of Gabidulin-based codes,
similar to the approach adopted in [3]. In this chapter we introduce a new type of attack
based on analyzing the elements of rank one in an extended public key. Using this new
strategy, we can cryptanalyze all three systems, effectively breaking them. Additionally,
our attack generalized Overbeck’s attack for the original GPT system and manages to
extend the attack to break the GPT system for all parameters.
The main results of this chapter can be found in [40]. In Section 5.1, we give a short
introduction to the MinRank and RSD problems as well as well as a summary of the most
efficient generic attacks. In Section 5.2, we prove some basic results that we will need for
our cryptanalysis. In Section 5.3 we give a new attack which can be used to break all
possible parameter sets for the GPT cryptosystem; generalizing Overbeck’s attack. In
Section 5.4, we show how our attack allows us to extend Overbeck’s attack to variants
of the designed to resist Overbeck’s attack. In two cases we are able to entirely break
the system, and in the other we are able to establish parameter values for which the
system is not safe. We note that some of the parameters for these systems are already
insecure based on generic attacks, however, our attacks are polynomial and therefore
more resilient to changes in parameter values [30]. Lastly, we use some observations from
the previous attacks to generalize the polynomial-time attack criterion by Gaborit at the
end of Section 5.5. The results of Section 5.5 are being finalized and will be presented
shortly.
5.1 MinRank and RSD Problems
Let R be a commutative ring with subsets S,E ⊆ R and let M ∈ E[x1, . . . , xt]m×n. Fix
an integer, r ≥ 0. The MinRank problem is to determine if there exists a solution so
that
min
(a1,...,at)∈St
rk (M(a1, . . . , at)) ≤ r.
The MinRank problem was proposed by Buss et al. in [10], in which it was shown that
the complexity of the problem depends heavily upon R and S. For our purposes, we are
interested in the case when E = S = Fq is a finite field. In this case, it was shown that
the MinRank problem is NP-complete.
Suppose that C ⊂ Fnqm is an Fq-linear rank metric code with basis b1, . . . , bt. Set
Mi = [bi] where [bi] ∈ Fm×nq is an expansion of bi into a matrix whose columns are the
elements of bi expanded according to a basis of Fqm over Fq in the canonical way. If C is
used to encrypt a message in the form
y =
t∑
i=1
xibi + e,
where rk(e) ≤ b(dRmin(C) − 1)/2c, then e will be the unique element of rank at most
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r = b(dRmin(C)− 1)/2c in C′ = 〈C,y〉Fq . Any element of C′ has the form
M = x0[y] +
t∑
i=1
xiMi ∈ Fq[x0, . . . , xt]m×n.
Solving the search version of the MinRank problem with bound r is then equivalent to
minimum distance decoding in C.
The case when the underlying code is linear over the extension field, Fqm , is clearly
a subset of the general MinRank problem. Any code of dimension k over Fqm is a km-
dimensional code over Fq, and can be solved using any algorithm for solving the general
MinRank problem. However, it is not known whether this subset of MinRank is NP-
complete or not. The RSD problem can stated as follows.
Definition 5.1.1. Let H ∈ F(n−k)×nqm , s ∈ Fn−kqm , and r a positive integer. The rank
syndrome decoding (RSD) problem, Rqm,n,k(H, s, r), is to determine if there exists a
c ∈ Fnqm such that rk(c) = r and Hct = s.
We are only concerned with the case when r is the error correction capability of
the code C = 〈H〉⊥Fqm , in which case it is clear that Rqm,n,k(H, s, r) is equivalent to
minimum distance decoding in C. Chabaud and Stern showed in [12] that for an arbitrary
H, Rqm,n,k(H, s, r) has complexity at most O(q(m−r)(r−1)). Ourivski and Johansson
improved this to O(q(k+1)(r−1)) [61]. Gaborit et al. studied this problem in [30] and
developed an algorithm which is exponential in complexity in general, but surprisingly,
polynomial in complexity for a large range of parameters. His approach is in some ways
a generalization of attacks based on guessing the error support, albeit adapted for the
rank metric.
The first approach taken in [30] is to consider trapping the vector space support. Let
y = x + e ∈ Fnqm be such that x ∈ C and wtR(e) = r. If E′ ⊆ Fqm is a subspace such
that suppvs(e) ⊆ E′, then we can reconstruct the coordinates of e from Fq-combinations
of elements of E′. Suppose that dim(E′) = r′ ≥ r and E′ contains each coordinate, ei,
of e. if {E′1, ..., E′r′} is a basis for E′, then we can write
ei =
r′∑
j=1
eijE
′
j .
Then, HyT = HeT and we obtain n− k equations over Fqm , or (n− k)m equations over
Fq. The number of unknowns (over Fq) is r′n (these are the ei,j), and therefore we can
solve this linear system if r′n ≤ (n− k)m.
Since we do not know suppvs(e) a priori, one must enumerate and search through
all possible E′ in the hopes of finding one containing suppvs(e). The probability that
suppvs(e) will be contained in a random r′ dimensional subspace E′ is[
r′
r
]
q[
m
r′
]
q
∼ q−r(m−r′).
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Setting r′ =
⌊
(n−k)m
n
⌋
and considering also the matrix inversion, we obtain
Rqm,n,k(H, s, r) ∼ O
(
(n− k)3m3qrd kmn e
)
,
for any r ≤ (n− k)m
n
.
An alternative attack, also proposed in [30] is to solve for the annulator polynomial of
suppvs(e). Let G ∈ Fk×nqm , a generator matrix for 〈H〉⊥Fqm . Let y = x+ e be the received
vector, with x ∈ 〈G〉Fqm . If we denote by Gi the ith row of G, we can write
x = mG =
k∑
i=1
miGi,
for some m. Since e has rank weight r, there exists a monic linearized polynomial
P = P0x+ P1x
[1] + ...+ Pr−1x[r−1] + x[r] of degree [r] vanishing on 〈e1, . . . , en〉Fq . This
gives,
P
(
yj −
k∑
i=1
migij
)
= 0. (5.1)
From here we obtain a system of n equations with k + r unknowns, the message coordi-
nates mi, and the coefficients of P . The equations we obtain are not linear, but they are
sparse. Overall, there are (k + 1)(r + 1) − 1 terms. After linearizing, one can obtain a
unique solution to this system if it is full rank. In [30], it is observed that (5.1) appears
to be generically full rank, and therefore we obtain following result.
Proposition 5.1.2 ([30]). Let C be a code with parity check matrix H ∈ F(n−k)×nqm capable
of correcting any error pattern, e, of rank weight r. Let y = x + e where x ∈ C. If k
satisfies (r + 1)(k + 1)− 1 ≤ n, and system (5.1) is a full rank linear system, then
Rqm,n,k(H,HyT , r) ∼ O(((r + 1)(k + 1)− 1)3).
An extension of Proposition 5.1.2 by guessing errors allowed the authors of [30] to
obtain the following corollary which we will call the error support (ES) attack.
Corollary 5.1.3. Let C ⊂ Fnqm be a code of dimension k capable of correcting r errors
with parity check matrix, H, and such that any generator matrix for C has column rank
n. If ⌈
(r + 1)(k + 1)− (n+ 1)
r
⌉
≤ k,
then
Rqm,n,k(H, s, r) ∼ O(r3k3qrd
(r+1)(k+1)−(n+1)
r
e).
Other generic attacks, for instance [61], are based on the idea of guessing the Grass-
mann support, rather than the vector space support of an element.
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5.2 Preliminaries
Recall from Corollary 3.1.13 that a matrix M ∈ Fk×nqm of rank t can be expressed as
M = M ′U , for M ′ ∈ Fk×tqm and U ∈ Ft×nq , and 〈U〉Fqm is called the Grassmann support
of M . We will also refer to U , the matrix, as a Grassmann support matrix. Of course,
what we mean is that U is a matrix representation for the Grassmann support ofM with
entries in Fq. We begin with the following important observation.
Lemma 5.2.1. Let G ∈ Fk×nqm be an arbitrary generator matrix for a Gabidulin code,
not necessarily in the form of (3.9). Then, we can recover a polynomial time decoding
algorithm with respect to G.
Proof. We first note from if the generating element of a Gabidulin code is known, then
an efficient decoding algorithm can be given for G of the form (3.9) [77]. Suppose that
〈G〉Fqm is the Gabidulin code Gabn,k(α) with dimension 1 < k < n and generator matrix
SG, where S ∈ GLk(Fqm) and G of the form (3.9). Note that Gabn,k(α)([1])∩Gabn,k(α)
is the Gabidulin code Gabn,k−1(α([1])) (see Lemma 3.2.10). Iterating with this new
Gabidulin code, we can eventually obtain a code of dimension 1, which is generated by
α([k−1]). If we take some non-zero element of this space, it has the form βα([k−1]), for
some β ∈ Fqm . Applying the Frobenius map coordinate-wise m− k+ 1 times, we obtain
an element of the form β[m−k+1]α. Using this element, we can construct a generator
matrix, for Gabn,k(α) having the form
β[m−k+1]
β[m−k+2]
. . .
β

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B

α1 α2 . . . αn
α
[1]
1 α
[1]
2 . . . α
[1]
n
...
α
[k−1]
1 α
[k−1]
2 . . . α
[k−1]
n

︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
.
The change of basis from SG to BG is then given by BS−1. For a message m ∈ Fkqm ,
encoded as mSG, we can now decode with respect to Gabn,k(β[m−k+1]α) to obtain
mSB−1. Then, applying BS−1, we can recover m.
Lemma 5.2.2. Let X ∈ Fk×nqm be a matrix of rank k and column rank t ≥ k with
Grassmann support matrix U ∈ Ft×nq . Then 〈X〉Fqm ⊆ 〈U〉Fqm and the inclusion is strict
if and only if t > k.
Proof. By Corollary 3.1.13, we can write X = V U for some V ∈ Fk×tqm . Thus, every row
of X is a Fqm-linear combination of the rows of U , which implies that 〈X〉Fqm ⊆ 〈U〉Fqm .
Since dim
(〈U〉Fqm) = t and dim (〈X〉Fqm) = k, we get equality if and only if k = t.
Lemma 5.2.3. Let X ∈ Fk×nqm be a matrix of column rank t and S ∈ GLk(Fqm). Then,
SX also has column rank t.
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Proof. Denote the ith column of X by Xi. Assume that SX has column rank less than
t, i.e. for any i1 < · · · < it ∈ {1, . . . , n} there exists a1, . . . , at ∈ Fq such that
t∑
`=1
a`(SX)i` = 0⇔ S
t∑
`=1
a`Xi` = 0⇔
t∑
`=1
a`Xi` = 0.
This is a contradiction to the fact that the column rank of X is t, therefore SX also
must have column rank t.
We saw that if a matrix X, with Grassmann support matrix U , has column rank
which is greater than its rank, then 〈X〉Fqm ( 〈U〉Fqm . The following theorem shows
that we can use the Frobenius map to recover 〈U〉Fqm from X.
Theorem 5.2.4. Let X ∈ Fk×nqm be a matrix of column rank s with Grassmann support
matrix U ∈ Fs×nq and let s′ ≥ s. Then,
s′−1∑
i=0
〈X〉([i])Fqm = 〈U〉Fqm .
In particular,
dim
(
s′−1∑
i=0
〈X〉([i])Fqm
)
= s.
Proof. We prove it for s′ = s. For the case s′ > s, successive coordinate-wise Frobenius
powers fix the space and therefore the statement remains true. Consider
〈X〉Fqm ⊆ 〈X〉Fqm + 〈X〉([1])Fqm ⊆ · · · ⊆
s−1∑
i=0
〈X〉([i])Fqm ⊆ 〈U〉Fqm .
By considering the dimension of each of the spaces in the chain above, we see that there
must exist ` ≤ s be such that,
`−1∑
i=0
〈X〉([i])Fqm =
∑`
i=0
〈X〉([i])Fqm .
Define s′ = dim
(∑`−1
i=0〈X〉([i])Fqm
)
. We note that s′ ≤ s since, for each i, 〈X〉([i])Fqm ⊂ 〈U〉Fqm
which has dimension s. We have(
`−1∑
i=0
〈X〉([i])Fqm
)([1])
=
∑`
i=1
〈X〉([i])Fqm ⊆
∑`
i=0
〈X〉([i])Fqm =
`−1∑
i=0
〈X〉([i])Fqm . (5.2)
Since the coordinate-wise Frobenius map preserves the dimension of spaces we must
have equality in (5.2). By Proposition 3.1.12 and the third point of Lemma 3.1.8, we can
express the sum on the right as the row space of a matrix U ′ ∈ Fs′×nq of (column) rank
s′. This implies that 〈X〉Fqm ⊆ 〈U ′〉Fqm . It follows from Proposition 3.1.12 that s′ ≥ s.
Therefore, we must have s = s′ and therefore 〈U〉Fqm = 〈U ′〉Fqm . Since ` ≤ s, we obtain
the result.
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Theorem 5.2.4 simply says that if one takes enough coordinate-wise Frobenius images
of a matrix, then they generate the Grassmann support. Now, we note that a matrix
X ∈ Fnqm can always be decomposed into a Moore matrix component XMoore and a
non-Moore matrix component Z as
X = XMoore + Z.
We will call such a decomposition a Moore decomposition.
Definition 5.2.5. A minimum column rank Moore decomposition is a Moore decompo-
sition in which the non-Moore component has lowest possible column rank.
Proposition 5.2.6 shows that, regardless of the choice of Moore decomposition, the
Grassmann support of a non-Moore matrix component of a minimum column rank Moore
decomposition is invariant with respect the decomposition.
Proposition 5.2.6. Suppose that X ∈ Fk×nqm is a matrix which has minimum column rank
Moore decomposition X = AMoore+A, where AMoore is a Moore matrix, and A has column
rank s. Then, any other minimum column rank Moore decomposition, X = BMoore +B,
satisfies that suppGr(A) = suppGr(B).
Proof. Let A have Grassmann support matrix U , and B have Grassmann support matrix
V . Write A = A′U and B = B′V with U, V ∈ Fs×nq according to Proposition 3.1.12. Let
E ∈ F(n−s)×nq be a parity check matrix for 〈V 〉Fqm . Then,
BMooreE
T = XET −BET = XET = AMooreET +AET ,
which yields
(BMoore −AMoore)ET = AET .
Since E is a matrix over Fq, (BMoore − AMoore)ET is a Moore matrix, therefore the
matrix AET must be a Moore matrix as well. The ith row of AET can be written as
(AET )i = (A1E
T )([i−1]). Since A itself is not necessarily a Moore matrix, row i of A
must be of the form Ai ∈ A([i−1])1 + ker(ET ), for i = 1, . . . , k. Then, we can write
A =

A1
A
([1])
1
...
A
([k−1])
1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A¯
+

κ1
κ2
...
κk

︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ′V
,
for κi ∈ ker(ET ) = 〈V 〉Fqm . If we let F ∈ F(n−s)×nq be a parity check matrix for 〈U〉Fqm ,
then AF T = 0 and hence A1F T = 0. Since F is a matrix over Fq, we also get A
([i])
1 F
T = 0
for i = 1, . . . , k − 1. Hence,
0 = AF T = A¯F T + κ′V F T = κ′V F T . (5.3)
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Since X = (AMoore + A¯) + κ′V is also a Moore decomposition of X, then the column
rank of κ′V must at least s and since 〈V 〉Fqm ⊇ 〈κ′V 〉Fqm we see that they must actually
be equal. Therefore, from Equation (5.3),
〈V 〉FqmF T = 0,
and therefore, 〈V 〉Fqm = 〈U〉Fqm , so the Grassmann supports ofA andB are the same.
Theorem 5.2.7. Let M ∈ Fk×nqm be a Moore matrix and X ∈ Fk×nqm be of column rank
s, where s is the rank of the non-Moore component in a minimum column rank Moore
decomposition of X. Let U ∈ Fs×nq be a Grassmann support matrix for X. Then, we
have
s∑
i=0
〈M +X〉([i])Fqm = 〈U〉Fqm +
s∑
i=0
〈M〉([i])Fqm .
Proof. Let Xi,Mi denote the ith row of X and M respectively, and let
X ′ =

X
([1])
1 −X2
X
([1])
2 −X3
...
X
([1])
k−1 −Xk
 ,M∗ =

M1
M
([1])
1
...
M
([k+s−1])
1
 , X∗ =

X1
X
([1])
1
...
X
([s−1])
1
X
([s])
1
X
([s])
2
...
X
([s])
k

.
Then, the space
∑s
i=0〈M +X〉([i])Fqm is generated by the row span of
M +X
(M +X)([1])
...
(M +X)([s])
 = S˜

M∗ +X∗
X ′
...
(X ′)([s−1])
 , (5.4)
for a suitable row transformation matrix S˜. We note that each row of X ′ must be
contained in 〈U〉Fqm , and therefore, each element of (X ′)([i]) must be as well. If we let
U ′ be a Grassmann support matrix of X ′, we must have dim
(〈U ′〉Fqm) = s′ ≤ s. By
Theorem 5.2.4,
s′−1∑
i=0
〈X ′〉([i])Fqm =
s−1∑
i=0
〈X ′〉([i])Fqm = 〈U
′〉Fqm ⊆ 〈U〉Fqm .
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We now want to show that 〈U ′〉Fqm = 〈U〉Fqm . Suppose for the sake of contradiction
that the rank of U ′ is strictly smaller than s. We write X as a Moore decomposition
X =

X1
X2
...
Xk
 =

X1
X
([1])
1
...
X
([k−1])
1
+

0
X2 −X([1])1
...
Xk −X([k−1])1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
X′′
.
We note that Xi+1−X [1]i ∈ 〈U ′〉Fqm for i = 1, . . . , k− 1. Starting from the first non-zero
row of X ′′, it follows that
(X2 −X([1])1 )([1]) = X([1])2 −X([2])1 ∈ 〈U ′〉Fqm
which implies
X
([1])
2 −X([2])1 − (X([1])2 −X3) ∈ 〈U ′〉Fqm
⇔ X3 −X([2])1 ∈ 〈U ′〉Fqm .
We recognize this as the second non-zero row of X ′′. Continuing in this fashion, we can
obtain that every row of X ′′ must belong to 〈U ′〉Fqm . Hence, X ′′ has column rank at
most s′ < s. However, this contradicts the fact that the minimal column rank Moore
decomposition has non-Moore component with column rank s. Therefore, by Proposition
5.2.6, U ′ has rank s and we have 〈U ′〉Fqm = 〈U〉Fqm .
Hence, the row space of the second matrix in (5.4) is equal to the row space of(
M∗ +X∗
U
)
which is in turn equal to the row space of(
M∗
U
)
,
because we can cancel X∗ by taking suitable elements of 〈U〉Fqm , since 〈X∗〉Fqm ⊆
〈U ′〉Fqm = 〈U〉Fqm . The result now follows.
Lemma 5.2.8. Let X ∈ Fk×nqm have minimum column rank Moore decomposition, X =
XMoore + Z. Then,
suppGr(Z) + suppGr(XMoore) = suppGr(X).
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Proof. Denote by ` = max{colrkFq(X), colrkFq(XMoore), colrkFq(Z)}. Using Theorems
5.2.4 and 5.2.7 we have,
suppGr(X) =
∑`
i=0
〈X〉([i])Fqm
=
∑`
i=0
〈XMoore + Z〉([i])Fqm
=
∑`
i=0
〈XMoore〉Fqm + suppGr(Z).
= suppGr(XMoore) + suppGr(Z).
Corollary 5.2.9. Let X ∈ Fk×nqm have minimum column rank Moore decomposition,
X = XMoore + Z. Then,
colrkFq(Z) ≤ colrkFq(X).
Corollary 5.2.10. Let M ∈ Fk×Nqm be a Moore matrix and X be of column rank t with
minimum column rank Moore decomposition X = XMoore + Z, where colrkFq(Z) = s.
Suppose that dRmin(〈M〉Fqm ) ≥ s+ t+ 2. Let U denote the space spanned by the elements
of rank one in
s∑
i=0
〈M +X〉([i])Fqm .
Then we have,
suppGr(Z) ⊆ U ⊆ suppGr(X).
Moreover, if s = t, then suppGr(Z) = U = suppGr(X).
Proof. Let U be the subspace spanned by all elements of rank one in
s∑
i=0
〈M +X〉([i])Fqm .
From Lemma 5.2.8, if X = XMoore +Z, is a minimum column rank decomposition, then
we know that suppGr(Z) ⊆ suppGr(X). Let H ∈ F(n−t)×nq be parity check matrix for
suppGr(X). Then, we have
dRmin
(
s∑
i=0
〈M +X〉([i])FqmH
T
)
= dRmin
(
s∑
i=0
〈M〉([i])FqmH
T
)
≥ (s+ t+ 2)− s− t
= 2,
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where the inequality comes from Lemma 3.2.10. Since wtR(x) ≥ wtR(xHT ), we must
have that all elements of U must belong to suppGr(X). By Theorem 5.2.7, suppGr(Z) ⊂ U
and therefore, if s = t they are equal.
Finally, we need the following lemma, which allows us to efficiently compute the
elements of rank one in a linear rank metric code. To accomplish this, we only need
to find the codewords that have all coordinates in Fq (all other rank one codewords are
Fqm-multiples of these).
Lemma 5.2.11. Let G ∈ Fk×nqm be in reduced row echelon form and denote by Gi the ith
row of G. Then the solutions to
k∑
i=1
ai(G
([1])
i −Gi) = 0, (5.5)
for variables ai ∈ Fq, represent the codewords of 〈G〉Fqm ∩ Fnq . Hence, a basis for the
space spanned by the elements of rank one in G can be found in polynomial time requiring
O(kmn2) operations over Fq.
Proof. Any codeword can be written as an Fqm-linear combination of the rows of G.
Since all rows of G have their pivot equal to 1, a codeword with entries only in Fq needs
to be an Fq-linear combination of the rows. Thus, we get that any codeword in Fnq can
be written as
∑k
i=1 aiGi for some ai ∈ Fq. Furthermore, we know that
v ∈ Fnq ⇔ v([1]) − v = 0,
hence
k∑
i=1
aiGi ∈ Fnq ⇔
k∑
i=1
ai(G
([1])
i −Gi) = 0.
In order to solve Equation (5.5), we require kn Frobenius maps in Fqm and a matrix
reduction on a matrix over Fq of size km×n and so finding the elements requires on the
order of kmn2 operations over Fq.
An algorithm for computing the elements of rank one from a matrix G is given in
Appendix A.1. We note that this algorithm only works for rank metric codes which are
linear over Fqm . For rank metric codes which are linear over Fq and not over Fqm , the
space spanned by an element of rank one may not include a vector belonging to Fnq .
Therefore, for a code which is linear over Fq, we could repeat the algorithm, but we
would have to solve for all Fq-lines, `α = {α · a | a ∈ Fq}, which corresponds to solving
x[1] − α[1]−1x for (qm − 1)/(q − 1) values of α.
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5.3 Cryptanalysis of GPT Cryptosystem
We note that for most parameters, the GPT cryptosystem was effectively broken by
Overbeck in [62]. Nevertheless, it is useful to demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack
first on the GPT cryptosystem before moving on to attack the variants which do resist
Overbeck’s attack. We note that our attack is still more general–we can break the GPT
cryptosystem for all parameters.
Recall that the public key generator matrix is of the form
Gpub = SG+X ∈ Fk×nqm ,
where G is a generator matrix of some Gabidulin code Gabn,k(α) capable of correcting
t′ errors, X ∈ Fk×nqm is a matrix of column rank t < t′, and S ∈ GLk(Fqm). Let X =
XMoore + Z be a minimum column rank Moore decomposition with colrkFq(Z) = s.
Note that, as an attacker, we do not have a priori knowledge of the parameter s (the
column rank of the non-Moore part in the minimal column rank Moore decomposition
of X). We can generally assume s = t, or else start with s = t and decrease the value
until the attack succeeds.
Theorem 5.3.1. Consider a GPT cryptosystem as defined in Subsection 4.2.1, where
S−1X = XMoore +Z is a minimal column rank Moore decomposition. Suppose an adver-
sary can find a full rank matrix U ′ ∈ Fs′×nq satisfying
suppGr(Z) ⊆ 〈U ′〉Fqm ⊆ suppGr(X),
then an encrypted message from a public key of the form (4.2) can be recovered in poly-
nomial time.
Proof. Let H ∈ F(n−s′)×nq be a parity check matrix for 〈U ′〉Fqm . Applying HT to the
public key generator matrix yields
GpubH
T = (SG+X)HT = S(G+XMoore)H
T .
From Lemma 5.2.8 we know that colrk(XMoore) ≤ t. Then, from Lemma 3.2.10, it
follows that 〈G+XMoore〉Fqm has minimum rank distance at least n− k+ 1− t, and that
〈G+XMooreHT 〉Fqm has minimum rank distance at least n− k+ 1− (t+ s′). Moreover,
GHT +XMooreH
T is a Moore matrix.
From the minimum distance we know that there are n− (t+s′) independent columns
in this matrix, which generate a Gabidulin code of minimum distance n− (t+s′)−k+1,
Gabn−(t+s′),k(γ), for some γ ∈ Fn−(t+s
′)
qm . From Lemma 5.2.1, we can recover a decoding
algorithm for Gabn−(t+s′),k(γ) with respect to the submatrix formed by these n− (t+s′)
columns. The error correction capability of Gabn−(t+s′),k(γ) is⌊
n− (t+ s′)− k
2
⌋
=
⌊
t′ − t+ s
′
2
⌋
≥ t′ − t ≥ rk(e) ≥ rk(eHT ),
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where the last inequality follows from the fact that H is a matrix over Fq. For an
encrypted message m(SG+X) + e, we have
(m(SG+X) + e)HT = mS(GHT +XMooreH
T ) + eHT .
When we restrict this to the above chosen independent columns, we can decode with
respect to the the submatrix generating Gabn−(t+s′),k(γ) and can therefore recover m.
All operations above are polynomial.
We can now use the previous result to break the GPT cryptosystem.
Corollary 5.3.2. Consider a GPT cryptosystem as defined in Subsection 4.2.1 with
public key generator matrix Gpub = SG + X ∈ Fk×nqm . For any such cryptosystem, an
encrypted message can be recovered in polynomial time.
Proof. Let S−1X = XMoore+Z be a minimal column rank Moore decomposition. Denote
by s the column rank of Z. We first note that dRmin(〈G〉Fqm ) ≥ s+t+2 is always satisfied.
To see this, we have
dRmin(〈G〉Fqm )− 1
2
≥
⌊
n− k
2
⌋
= t′ > t ≥ s+ t
2
.
By Corollary 5.2.10, all the elements of rank one in
s∑
i=0
〈G+XMoore + Z〉([i])Fqm =
s∑
i=0
〈SG+X〉([i])Fqm
belong to the Grassmann support of X, and therefore from Lemma 5.2.11 we can find a
matrix U ′ with entries in Fq, the rows of which are a basis for the elements of rank one
in
∑s
i=0〈SG + X〉([i])Fqm . Furthermore, dim(〈U ′〉Fqm ) = s′ ≤ t and suppGr(Z) ⊂ 〈U ′〉Fqm
from Theorem 5.2.7. Using Theorem 5.3.1 we can recover the message.
5.4 Cryptanalysis of GGPT Variants
In this section, we show how one can use information about the elements of rank one
in order to recover some structure about the public key. As the public key contains no
elements of rank one by construction, some transformation of the code must be performed
which predictably changes the structure so that the elements of rank one leak some
information which we can exploit to determine the structure of the system.
5.4.1 LGGPT Variant Cryptanalysis
We first consider the LGGPT variant. Recall that the LGGPT variant has a public key
of the form
Gˆpub = S[X | G]σ,
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where G ∈ Fk×nqm is a generator matrix of a Gabidulin code, S ∈ GLk(Fqm), σ ∈ GLn(Fq),
and X is a randomly chosen matrix of column rank tˆ over Fq and rank a. We saw in
Section 4.2.1 that a must satisfy
a(n− k) < tˆ.
Under this constraint, we can not recover the structure of X without interference from
the structure of G. In particular, we have
b tˆ
a
c∑
i=0
〈[X | 0]σ〉([i])Fqm ( suppGr([X | 0]σ),
but
suppGr([0 | G]σ) =
n−k∑
i=0
〈[0 | G]σ〉([i])Fqm ⊂
b tˆ
a
c∑
i=0
〈[0 | G]σ〉([i])Fqm .
Therefore, Overbeck’s attack will certainly fail, since we cannot recover the structure of
the designed error part before we obtain the structure of the Gabidulin part of the public
key.
Our strategy will be to recover suppGr([0 | G]σ) in some extended matrix. Before we
can proceed, we will need to make some assumptions regarding the behavior of X as well
as that of random subcodes of Gabidulin codes. First, note that there is a suitable row
transformation, T ∈ GLn(Fqm), so that
TGˆpub =
(
X∗ G∗
0 G∗∗
)
σ, (5.6)
where X∗ ∈ Fa×tˆqm is a matrix with the same row span as X, and G∗ and G∗∗ are matrices
which span subcodes of 〈G〉Fqm . One can easily see that 〈[X∗ | G∗]σ〉Fqm and 〈[0 |
G∗∗]σ〉Fqm intersect trivially and we can therefore ignore σ for the time being.
We want to be able to generate suppGr([0 | G]) from 〈G∗∗〉Fqm . We note that if
G∗∗ =
 g...
g([k−a−1])
 ,
then we can recover suppGr([0 | G]) as
suppGr([0 | G]) =
d nk−ae−1∑
i=0
〈G∗∗〉([i(k−a)])Fqm .
Therefore we make the following assumption. Table 5.1 gives some evidence for why
these assumptions appear to be generically satisfied.
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Assumption 5.4.1. Let G ∈ Fk×nqm be a generator matrix of a Gabidulin code, and
B ⊂ 〈G〉Fqm be a random subspace of 〈G〉Fqm of codimension a. Set
` =
⌈
n
k − a
⌉
. (5.7)
With high probability, we have
`−1∑
i=0
B([i(k−a)]) = Fnqm . (5.8)
The value of ` in (5.7) is the smallest possible value for which we can obtain equality
in (5.8). One could choose ` larger than in (5.7), although in doing so there is a trade
off. This is related to our next assumption.
Assumption 5.4.2. Let X ∈ Fk×tˆqm be a random matrix of rank a. For ` given in (5.7),
if `a tˆ, then with high probability,
`−1∑
i=0
〈X〉([i(k−a)])Fqm
contains no elements of rank one.
The idea is that since we expect a random space of high codimension not to contain
elements of rank one, we want to keep
`−1∑
i=0
〈[X∗ | G∗]〉[i(k−a)]Fqm
small whilst still being able to construct suppGr([0 | G]). This is summarized in the
following theorem.
Theorem 5.4.3. Let S ∈ GLk(Fqm), σ ∈ GLn+tˆ(Fq), G ∈ Fk×nqm , and X ∈ Fk×tˆqm be of
rank a, and consider Loidreau’s GGPT variant with public key
Gˆpub = S[X | G]σ.
If Assumptions 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 are true, then we can break the Loidreau GGPT variant
in polynomial time with high probability.
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Proof. Let ` be as in (5.7) and TGˆpub as in (5.6). Consider the matrix
G′′ext :=

Gˆpub
Gˆ
([k−a])
pub
...
Gˆ
([(k−a)(`−1)])
pub
 = S˜

(X∗ | G∗)
(X∗ | G∗)([k−a])
...
(X∗ | G∗)([(k−a)(`−1)])
(0 | G∗∗)
(0 | G∗∗)([k−a])
...
(0 | G∗∗)([(k−a)(`−1)])

︸ ︷︷ ︸
G¯
σ.
Since 〈G∗∗〉Fqm is a subcode of 〈G〉Fqm of codimension a, by Assumption 5.4.1, we have
with high probability,
`−1∑
i=0
〈G∗∗〉([(k−a)i]) = Fnqm .
Then, the bottom submatrix of G¯ has the same row span as [0 | In], and hence, by using
elementary operations, we can eliminate the second component of every row in the top
submatrix of G¯. Then, the space generated by the rows of G′′ext is the same as that
generated by
G′′′ext =

X∗ 0
(X∗)([k−a]) 0
...
...
(X∗)([(k−a)(`−1)]) 0
0 In
σ.
By Assumption 5.4.2, with high probability we have that
`−1∑
i=0
〈X∗〉([(k−a)i])Fqm
contains no elements of rank one, and therefore all elements of rank one in 〈G′′ext〉Fqm =
〈G′′′ext〉Fqm must belong to 〈[0 | In]〉Fqmσ. With the help of Lemma 5.2.11 we can recover
a matrix U ∈ Fn×(tˆ+n)q which is a basis for 〈[0 | In]〉Fqmσ. Then, any parity check matrix
HU ∈ Ftˆ×(n+tˆ)q for 〈[0 | In]〉σ must have the form
HTU = σ
−1
[
A
0
]
∈ F(n+tˆ)×tˆq ,
where A ∈ GLtˆ(Fq). It follows that if we compute
GˆpubH
T
U = SXA ∈ Fk×tˆqm ,
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then there exists a unique matrix V = [A−1 | 0]σ ∈ Ftˆ×(n+tˆ)q such that
GˆpubH
T
UV = SXAV = S[X | 0]σ.
We can find the matrix V by observing that
(Gˆpub − GˆpubHTUV )HTU = S[0 | G]σHTU = 0. (5.9)
This gives a linear system of equations with tˆ(n+ tˆ) variables and ktˆ equations over Fqm .
Since the variables can take values in Fq, we can expand each equation into m equations
over Fq, obtaining a system of kmtˆ equations and tˆ(n+ tˆ) variables over Fq. Hence, we
can solve if km ≥ n+ tˆ which is always satisfied for GGPT cryptosystems.
Now, let HV ∈ Fn×(n+tˆ)qm be any dual matrix for V . Then, HV has the form
HTV = σ
−1
[
0
B
]
,
for some B ∈ GLn(Fq). Therefore,
GˆpubH
T
V = SGB ∈ Fk×nqm
is a Gabidulin code of minimum distance n−k+1, from which we can recover a decoding
algorithm, as in Lemma 5.2.1. If we receive an encrypted message of the form
mGˆpub + e,
we can apply HTV , obtaining
mSGB + eHTV .
Since
rk(eHTV ) ≤ wtR(e) ≤ n− k + 1,
we can recover the encrypted message, m, from the recovered decoding algorithm with
respect to SGB. All the operations required for this attack can be performed in polyno-
mial time.
We will conclude this section with an example in which we perform our attack against
the parameters proposed by Loidreau in [49] in order to resist Overbeck’s attack. The
proposed parameters are not secure against our attack.
Example 5.4.4. Consider an LGGPT variant with q = 2, m = n = 24, k = 12, a = 3,
and tˆ = 40, i.e. the first set of parameters from Table 5.1. Assume we, as an attacker,
know the public generator matrix Gˆpub ∈ F12×64224 and received an encrypted message y.
We compute ` = d 2412−3e = 3 and proceed as follows:
1. We compute Gˆ([9])pub , Gˆ
([18])
pub to obtain the extended matrix G
′′
ext ∈ F36×64224 . This
requires at most 1536 = 2 · 12 · 64 Frobenius powers in F224 . Using a normal basis
to represent F224 over F2, this can be done very efficiently.
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m n k a tˆ Assumption 5.4.1 Assumption 5.4.2
24 24 12 3 40 ∼ 1 ∼ 1
24 24 12 4 52 ∼ .998 ∼ 1
Table 5.1: Experimental results for Assumptions 1 and 2: Probabilities of success in 1000
trials for q = 2.
2. We find the elements of rank one in 〈G′′ext〉Fqm , as described in Lemma 5.2.11. To
do so we need to row reduce G′′ext and then solve a linear system over F2 with 36
unknowns and 24 · 64 = 1536 equations. Then, if Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, we
find some basis matrix U ∈ F24×642 , such that 〈U〉Fqm contains all these elements of
rank one.
3. Compute a dual matrix HU for U .
4. We find a matrix V ∈ F40×642 , solving Equation (5.9).
5. We compute a parity check matrix HV ∈ F24×642 for V , and compute the product
GˆpubH
T
V .
6. We recover a decoding algorithm for the code GˆpubHTV , as described in Lemma
5.2.11, and decode yHTV with this algorithm.
We observe that step 4 above is the most computationally intensive, and therefore
we estimate the complexity of our attack based on these step. This is done by solving a
(40 · 64)× (24 · 12 · 40) system over F2 by Gaussian elimination on the resulting matrix.
This requires on the order of 239 operations over F2. Implementing the algorithm on a
personal computer, we are able to break random instances of this cryptosystem with high
probability for the proposed parameters. Futhermore the attack appears to be resilient
to changes in the values of the parameters.
Table 5.1 contains some preliminary results regarding the validity of Assumptions
5.4.1 and 5.4.2. For the parameters in the second row of the table, we can similarly
break the system, albeit with slightly higher complexity due the larger parameters. We
note that these parameters were previously deemed insufficient using generic attacks
[30]. Nevertheless, our attack is significantly faster and would even be resilient against
an increase in the parameters.
5.4.2 SA Variant Cryptanalysis
Recall that the designed error matrix in the SA variant is constructed as X = XMoore+Z,
where this decomposition is a minimal column rank Moore decomposition, and XMoore
has rank a and Z has column rank tˆ− a. We can rewrite
Gˆpub = S[XMoore | G]σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
+S[Z | 0]σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
X′
. (5.10)
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We observe that S−1M is a Moore matrix generating a code of minmum rank distance
at least n− k + 1, and X ′ is a matrix of column rank tˆ− a.
Theorem 5.4.5. Consider a GGPT cryptosystem as defined above. Suppose an ad-
versary can find a matrix U ′ ∈ F(tˆ−a)×(tˆ+n)q such that 〈U ′〉Fqm = suppGr([Z | 0]σ) =
suppGr(X ′). Then an encrypted message from a public key of the form (4.4) can be
recovered in polynomial time.
Proof. Let U ∈ F(tˆ−a)×tˆq be a Grassmann support matrix for Z, that is 〈U〉Fqm =
suppGr(Z). Then, U ′ = [U | 0]σ is a Grassmann support matrix for X ′. Let HU ∈ Fa×tˆq
be a parity check matrix for U . If HU ′ ∈ F(a+n)×(tˆ+n)q is any parity check matrix for U ′,
then (HU ′)T must be of the form
(HU ′)
T = σ−1
[
HTU 0tˆ×n
0n×a In
]
A,
for some A ∈ GLn+a(Fq).
We compute,
Gˆpub(HU ′)
T = S[XMoore | G]σ(HU ′)T + S[Z | 0]σ(HU ′)T
= S[XMoore | G]
[
HTU 0tˆ×n
0n×a In
]
A
= S[XMooreH
T
U | G]A.
SinceXMooreHTU is again a Moore matrix, we can find n independent columns of Gˆpub(HU ′)
T
which will form a Gabidulin code of minimum distance n − k + 1, which has error cor-
rection capability t′. Denote the columns by i = (i1, . . . , in) and the corresponding
submatrix, Gi. From Lemma 5.2.1, we can recover a decoding algorithm for 〈Gi〉Fqm
with respect to Gi. We note that if e is an error of rank at most t′, and we denote by e′
the subvector of e(HU ′)T corresponding to columns i, then
rk(e′) ≤ rk(e(HU ′)T ) ≤ rk(e) ≤ t′.
Ifm is an encrypted message of the formm = mGˆpub +e, then applying HTU ′ we obtain
m(HU ′)
T = mGˆpub(HU ′)
T + e(HU ′)
T .
Restricting to the coordinates i, we obtain
mGi + e
′,
from which we can decode to recover m.
Corollary 5.4.6. We can recover an encrypted message from the SA variant of the
GGPT cryptosystem in polynomial time if
tˆ− a < n− k − 1
2
.
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Proof. Recall that
Gˆpub = S[XMoore | G]σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
+S[Z | 0]σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
X′
,
and note that S−1M+S−1X ′ is a minimal column rank Moore decomposition of S−1Gˆpub.
S−1M is a Moore matrix generating a code of minimum rank distance at least n− k+ 1.
Since
n− k + 1 > 2(tˆ− a) + 2,
from Corollary 5.2.10, all elements of rank one in
tˆ−a∑
i=0
〈S−1M + S−1X ′〉([i])Fqm
span the space suppGr(X ′) = suppGr([Z | 0]σ). We can then find these elements
of rank one using Corollary 5.2.10, to obtain a matrix U ′ ∈ F(tˆ−a)×(tˆ+n)q such that
〈U ′〉Fqm = suppGr(X ′). Applying Theorem 5.4.5, we can break the SA variant of the
GGPT cryptosystem.
The following example illustrates a small example of how Overbeck’s attack fails, but
our attack recovers the encrypted message.
Example 5.4.7. Let q = 2, n = 8, k = 3, tˆ = 3, a = 1 and g1, . . . , g8 ∈ F28 linearly
independent over F2. Consider the generator matrix of a Gabidulin code
G =
 g1 g2 . . . g8g([1])1 g([1])2 . . . g([1])8
g
([2])
1 g
([2])
2 . . . g
([2])
8
 ,
and, for some x ∈ F28\F2, the matrices
XMoore =
 x 0 0x([1]) 0 0
x([2]) 0 0
 , Z =
 0 1 11 0 1
1 1 0
 .
Let
X = XMoore + Z,
so that the public key generator matrix is given by
Gˆpub = [X | G] =
 x 1 1 g1 g2 . . . g8x([1]) + 1 0 1 g([1])1 g([1])2 . . . g([1])8
x([2]) + 1 1 0 g
([2])
1 g
([2])
2 . . . g
([2])
8
 .
For simplicity we let S = I3 and σ = I11. Compute the extended matrix,
Gext =
(
Gˆpub
Gˆ
([1])
pub
)
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which can be put in the form
G′ext =

x 0 0 g1 g2 . . . g8
x([1]) 0 0 g
([1])
1 g
([1])
2 . . . g
([1])
8
x([2]) 0 0 g
([2])
1 g
([2])
2 . . . g
([2])
8
x([3]) 0 0 g
([3])
1 g
([3])
2 . . . g
([3])
8
1 0 1 0 0 . . . 0
0 1 1 0 0 . . . 0

=
(
X∗ G∗
X∗∗ 0
)
by a suitable row transformation. Here Overbeck’s attack fails, because X∗∗ does not
have full rank. On the other hand, our attack succeeds, since we can directly recover the
elements of rank one as 〈[X∗∗ | 0]〉Fqm = 〈[Z | 0]〉Fqm . Thus we can use Theorem 5.4.5
and recover any encrypted message.
5.5 Column Scrambler Variant and Generalization of Gaborit’s Attack
Recall the CS variant from Subsection 4.2.4. Let G be a generator matrix for a t-error
correcting Gabidulin code. Let 0 < t1 < t be a design parameter and let Pn,t,t1(Fqm) ⊂
GLn(Fqm) be given by
Pn,t,t1 = {[Q1 | Q2]σ |Q1 ∈ Fn×(t−t1)qm , Q2 ∈ Fn×(n−t+t1)q
s.t. rk([Q1 | Q2]) = n, σ ∈ GLn(Fq)}.
For a random P ∈ Pn,t,t1(Fqm), the public generator matrix is of the form κpub = SGP−1.
The structure of P−1 is not immediately clear from the definition of Pn,t,t1(Fqm). The
assumption behind the security of such a system is that the matrices P−1 appear random
in the set GLn(Fqm). We show that by considering carefully the elements of rank one
in the extended code, the matrices P ∈ P are revealed to have quite a lot of structure.
In particular, they do not alter the structure of G sufficiently enough so that we can
recover some information from the elements of rank one in the extended code. While we
do not prove any results about the structure of P−1, we generate data to support some
assumptions which, if true, allow us to easily break the CS system. The attack on this
particular variant is therefore unlike the cryptanalysis of the LGGPT and SA variants,
where we can exhibit a proof of a break. Rather than find a structural flaw in P−1 that
renders it amenable to an attack, we instead give statistical evidence that there exists
a exploitable structure of the public key in the generic case. In fact, in thousands of
randomly generated instances of the column scrambler variant, there were none in which
our attack did not succeed.
Recall in Proposition 5.1.2 that it was shown how generic rank metric codes with
certain parameters sets were found to have polynomial time decoding algorithms. In
order to emphasize the difference in our approach, we recall that the proof required the
use of linearized polynomials and argued based on the ability to reconstruct the vector
space support of the error vector. We will take an alternative approach which instead
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considers the Grassmann support of the error vector, which works for more general
parameters than Proposition 5.1.2.
Theorem 5.5.1. Let C be a code with parity check matrix H ∈ F(n−k)×nqm capable of
correcting any error pattern, e, of weight r. Let y = x + e where x ∈ C. Suppose that
for some s, with (s,m) = 1, we have
dim(C([s]) ∩ C) = `.
If
(k + 1)(r + 1)− 1 ≤ n+ (r − 1)` (5.11)
and C ∩ U = {0}, where U is the space spanned by the elements of rank one in
Cext =
r−1∑
i=0
(C + 〈e〉Fqm)([si]) ,
then
Rqm,n,k(H,HyT , r) ∼ O(r(k + 1)mn2).
Proof. Let G ∈ Fk×nqm be a generator matrix for 〈H〉⊥Fqm and mG ∈ C. Let y = mG+ e
be a corrupted codeword. Observe that
suppGr(e) =
r−1∑
i=0
〈e〉([si])Fqm ⊆ U .
Denote u = dim(U), and let HU ∈ F(n−u)×nq be a parity check matrix for U . We have,
u ≤ dim(Cext) ≤ (k + 1)r − (r − 1)` ≤ n− k,
where the last inequality follows from (5.11). Moreover, we have
yHTU = mGH
T
U + eH
T
U = mGH
T
U . (5.12)
Since C ∩ U = {0}, we have that that GHTU is a full rank matrix. Therefore we can
solve (5.12) in polynomial time, e.g. with the Gaussian algorithm, which implies the
statement. In order to obtain the complexity, we assume that taking Frobenius powers
is computationally inexpensive by supposing we represent vectors in Fnqm via a normal
basis. Then, the most expensive step is to obtain HU , which we can do by Lemma 5.2.11,
where we need to find the elements of rank one in the span of a r(k+1)×n matrix which
represents Cext.
Remark 5.5.2. The condition (5.11) in Theorem 5.5.1 is not necessary, however, it
allows for a comparison to the conditions in Proposition 5.1.2. We note that when ` = 0,
this bound reduces to that obtained by Gaborit et al. To generalize this idea, we note
that this attack can be applied as long as the condition rk(GHTU ) = k holds; i.e. the
only condition we actually require is that C ∩ U = {0}. This raises a similar concern as
in the proof of 5.1.2 in which it is necessary for the system arising in (5.1) to be a full
rank system of equations. It is not clear how the condition that GHTU being full rank
(equivalently C ∩ U = {0}) relates to the condition of (5.1) being full rank.
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In the proof of Theorem 5.5.1, the bound (5.11) arises from the worst case scenario,
u = dim(Cext). In general this bound may be quite inaccurate. We can actually use a
weaker condition to guarantee that we can still break the cryptosystem. We therefore
make the following definition.
Definition 5.5.3. Let C ∈ FNqm be a linear code of dimension k with rank error correction
capability r. We say that C is r-Frobenius weak if, for some s relatively prime to m and
for any e ∈ FNqm of rank at most r, the space U , spanned by the elements of rank one in
r−1∑
i=0
(C + 〈e〉Fqm )([si]) =
r−1∑
i=0
C([si]) + suppGr(e),
satisfies C ∩ U = {0}.
Remark 5.5.4. If C is r-Frobenius weak, then we can solve the rank syndrome decoding
problem for C in polynomial time. In general, we do not need such a certain condition;
it is enough that for most choices of e ∈ FNqm of rank r, dim(C ∩ U) = {0}. Then, such a
code would be a bad candidate for a rank-based cryptosystem.
We now return to the CS variant. Table 5.2 summarizes some values for the CS
variant, including the rank of GpubHTU = (SGP
−1)HTU , where HU is as in the proof of
Theorem 5.5.1. These values were generated from random instances of the CS variant.
One can then deduce – without explicitly describing their structure – that the matrices
SGP−1 are rather non-generic. It appears that they are t1-Frobenius weak, probably
because they have quite high intersection with their coordinate-wise Frobenius image.
Based on experimental data, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 5.5.5. A matrix of the form SGP−1 as in 4.2.4 is t1-Frobenius weak.
Corollary 5.5.6. If Assumption 5.5.5 holds, then we can break the CS variant in poly-
nomial time.
For all instances of the values we tested, Assumption 5.5.5 appears to hold. In
particular, in thousands of randomly generated encrypted messages according to the CS
variant, there were no instances in which the attack did not successfully recover the
message. The necessary code is given in Appendix A.3. Therefore, we consider the CS
variant unusable. As explained before, for certain parameters, Gaborit et al. were able
to cryptanalyze the CS variant using a generic rank syndrome decoding algorithm [30].
However, a small increase in the parameters renders the generic algorithm infeasible.
In contrast, our algorithm remains effective even for larger parameters, as evidenced by
Table 5.2.
Remark 5.5.7. In this chapter, we attacked and manage to cryptanalyze nearly all exist-
ing variants of rank metric based cryptosystems where the underlying code is Gabidulin.
Our attack generalizes the attack of Overbeck, and is based on computing the elements
of rank one in an extended code. Using this same idea, we are able to establish a gen-
eralization of a result by Gaborit et al. which indicates that codes that overlap with
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m n k t1 u rk(GpubHTU )
28 28 14 3 7 14
28 28 14 4 7 14
42 42 21 4 11 21
42 42 21 5 11 21
42 42 21 6 11 21
48 48 24 6 12 24
48 48 24 7 12 24
48 48 24 8 12 24
48 48 24 9 12 24
Table 5.2: Experimental results for the CS variant
respect to the coordinate-wise Frobenius map may be weak candidates for use in rank
based cryptography.
We note then, that codes also based on the twisted Gabidulin codes of Sheekey would
also be poor choices for use in rank metric based cryptosystems, since their intersection is
almost as large as that of Gabidulin codes (they intersect their coordinate-wise Frobenius
power in dimension just one less). On the other hand, the LRPC codes introduced in
Subsection 3.2.3 do not in general intersect their Frobenius powers. Therefore, they may
resist such attacks as described here. However, other structural flaws may be found
which may allow one to exploit the elements of rank one. In general, more attention
is needed to determine if these codes resist all known attacks, including attacks based
on creating elements of rank one as outlined in this thesis. To the best of this author’s
knowledge, after cryptanalysis of the GGPT and CS variants, the LRPC codes are the
only remaining feasible proposal for rank metric based cryptography.
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Chapter 6
Subspace Fuzzy Vault
Fuzzy vault is the term used by Juels and Sudan in [42] to describe a cryptographic
primitive in which a key, κ, is hidden by a set of features, A, in such a way that any
witness, B which is close enough to A under the set difference metric can decommit
κ. Fuzzy vault is related to the fuzzy commitment scheme of Juels and Wattenberg
[41], as well as the notion of fuzzy extractors [22]. The motivation for fuzzy vault is
related to the growing interest in using fuzzy authentication systems, i.e. systems that
do not require an exact key match, but rather a partial one. An obvious application
of such a system would be a biometric authentication scheme, since one cannot expect
a biometric submission to be replicated exactly every time. Other applications include
personal entropy systems and privacy-protected matching.
In early biometric systems, comparison of the biometric was performed against an im-
age stored locally in unencrypted form so an image processing algorithm could compare
directly the images. For security purposes–as is the case, for instance, with passwords–
sensitive data should be stored in some indecipherable form. In the case of passwords,
a significantly complicated hash function is used, however, hash values are dramatically
different even when the values of the inputs are very close. Therefore, hashing of finger-
prints and comparison of hash values would make it difficult to compare an authentic
user with a stored template. Without performing some sort of hashing, sensitive data
can be easily read if an attacker gains unintended access. In the case of biometric data,
an adversary with access to the biometric has the same access as the authentic user; it
is unsafe to use again on any system. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to secure
biometric data.
The main results of this chapter have recently appeared in [53] in collaboration with
the coauthors. In Section 6.1, we present the fuzzy vault scheme proposed by Juels and
Sudan, which works for codes that can be represented as the evaluation of polynomials.
In Section 6.2, we propose an alternative construction of the fuzzy vault designed to work
for constant-dimension subspace codes. In doing so, there are some extra concerns that
much be taken. Although estimates for security are somewhat similar, using subspace
codes allows for a different trade-off in parameter relationships for a fuzzy vault system.
The security and other concerns are investigated in Section 6.3.
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6.1 Preliminaries
As was mentioned briefly in Section 2.3, we want to create a locking system that releases
the key if the difference between the template and a witness is small. In order to measure
this difference, we will use the following metric, which we note is permutation invariant.
Definition 6.1.1. Let A,B be sets. The set difference metric, d4, is given by
d4(A,B) = |(A \B) ∪ (B \A)|.
We briefly state some of the necessary background and then define the fuzzy vault as
it is given in [42], which we will distinguish from our construction by referring to it as
the polynomial fuzzy vault (PFV) scheme.
Definition 6.1.2. Let C ⊂ Fnqm be a rank metric code. The subspace code defined by
L(C) = {〈[Im | [x]]〉Fq | x ∈ C} ⊂ Gr(m,Fn+mq ),
is called the lifting of the rank metric code, C.
For more information on construction of subspace codes by lifting of rank metric
codes, the reader is directed to [68, 23, 74]. The following lemma can be found in any of
the aforementioned papers.
Lemma 6.1.3. Let C ⊂ Fnqm be a rank metric code of minimum distance d and dimension
k. Then,
dminS (L(C)) = 2d.
Proof. Let [x], [y] ∈ Fm×nq for codewords x,y ∈ C. Note that dim(〈[Im | [x]]〉Fq = m for
every x ∈ C. We have
dim(〈[Im | [x]]〉Fq + 〈[Im | [y]]〉Fq) = rk
(
Im [x]
Im [y]
)
= rk
(
Im [x]
0 [y − x]
)
≥ m+ dminS (C).
Also,
dim(〈[Im | [x]]〉Fq ∩ 〈[Im | [y]]〉Fq) ≤ m− dminS (C).
Therefore,
dS(〈[Im | [x]]〉Fq , 〈[Im | [y]]〉Fq) ≥ 2dminS (C)
with equality if x,y attain the minimum distance of C.
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Recall from Definition 2.1.3, that a subspace code S ⊂ Grq(k,Fnq ) forms a spread if
the codewords of S intersect trivially and the union of the codewords is all of Fnq . Such
a subspace code will be called a spread code. Let α ∈ Fk
qk
be a vector of independent
elements over Fq and let C be the Gabidulin code Gabk,1(α). Each element x ∈ Fkqk
corresponds to a matrix [x] ∈ Fk×kq . Since the minimum distance of C is k, then L(C)
has minimum distance 2k (hence the codewords of L(C) intersect trivially). Let
S = L(C) ∪ {〈[0 | Ik]〉Fq}. (6.1)
To see that S is a spread code, we first observe that
|S| = qk + 1 = q
2k − 1
qk − 1 ,
so S has the correct cardinality. Furthermore, we can observe that
rk
(
Ik [x]
0 Ik
)
= 2k
for every x ∈ C. Together with Lemma 6.1.3 we see that S is indeed a spread code.
Inductively, we can create spread codes for any n, k, q, as long as n = k` is a multiple
of k, in the following way. For i = 1, . . . , `, define
Sk,`,i = {〈[ 0k×k︸︷︷︸
`th block
| . . . | 0k×k | Ik︸︷︷︸
ith block
| [xi−1] | . . . | [x1]]〉Fq | xj ∈ C}.
Then, the subspace code
Sk,` =
⋃`
i=1
Sk,`,i
is a (k`, k)q-spread code. Note that we have already constructed S from (6.1) as
Sk,2 = Sk,2,1 ∪ Sk,2,2.
This construction is equivalent to the construction of [52]. Generalizations of spreads for
the case when k - n have been considered, for instance in [36].
Spread codes are not the only constant dimension subspace codes. Other examples
include codes from Ferrer diagrams [24] and a Reed-Solomon-like construction [44].
We now describe the PFV scheme. Let κ = (κ0, . . . , κ`−1) ∈ F`q be a secret key, and
let
κ(x) =
`−1∑
i=0
kix
i, (6.2)
be the corresponding key polynomial. Let A ⊂ F∗q be a template with |A| = t > `.
Choose r > t and select a set B ⊂ F∗q \ A such that |B| = r − t. Let λ : Fq → Fq be a
random map such that λ(x) 6= κ(x) for all x ∈ B. Construct the sets
Pauth = {(x, κ(x)) | x ∈ A},
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Pchaff = {(x, λ(x)) | x ∈ B},
and set
V = Pauth ∪ Pchaff.
We will call Pauth the authentic points and the set Pchaff the chaff points. V will be
called the vault.
Let g = (g1, . . . , gt) be some ordering of the points in A, and construct the Reed-
Solomon code, C = RSt,`(g) as in Definition 2.0.10. Then, the evaluation of the key
polynomial on the points g is a codeword of C. In order to access the key, a witness
submits a set of features, W ⊂ Fq. Let Z ⊂ V be the set of vault points (x, y) with
x ∈W . As the error correction capability of C is b(t− `)/2c, the witness needs
|Z ∩ Pauth| ≥ t−
⌊
t− `
2
⌋
= dminH (C)− 1
in order to recover κ(x) from a minimum distance decoding algorithm for C.
The following attack was used by Mihăilescu in [55] to estimate the security of such
a system. Since any witness set will result in a possibly spurious key, in order to attack
the system, we need some guarantee that we have found the actual key. The idea behind
the attack is to randomly build key polynomials by interpolating more than ` points.
The probability that δ > ` points interpolate to a polynomial of degree smaller than δ
quickly tends to 0 under randomness assumptions. Therefore, if an attacker constructs
a polynomial of smaller degree than the number of points used, it is fairly plausible that
the attacker has stumbled upon the actual key.
We will assume that an attacker has access to the vault, but cannot distingiush the
authentic and chaff sets. An adversary chooses a value ` < δ ≤ t and randomly generates
δ elements of V. Say W ′ = {w1, . . . , wδ} is such a set. The following refinement of this
idea uses the following lemma, which is due to [15, 55].
Lemma 6.1.4. Let ` ≤ δ ≤ t be such that among all polynomials, g, of degree `−1 arising
from interpolation of some vault points, κ(x) is the only one which interpolates at least
δ points with probability close to 1. Then, κ can be recovered in less than 8` log2 ` · (r/t)`
operations.
Using this result, it was shown that certain reasonable parameters for the PFV scheme
cause the system to be susceptible to a brute force attack. Choi et al. in [14] sped up
the attack by using a fast polynomial reconstruction algorithm. For further information,
including concerns about implementation and feature alignment the reader is directed to
[58, 78].
6.2 SFV Scheme
This particular variant of the fuzzy vault will be called the subspace fuzzy vault (SFV)
in order to distinguish from Juels and Sudan’s version which makes use of polynomial
reconstruction. Unlike the PFV scheme in which the key is given by the coefficients of a
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polynomial, the key κˆ in this scheme will be a subspace encoded via a matrix, κ, whose
row space is κˆ. We remark that our construction is analogous to the construction of
the PFV in that the key is a codeword and the features encode (possibly redundant)
information about the codeword.
Let ` ≤ k ≤ n, C ⊂ Gr(`,Fnq ) be a constant dimension subspace code, and κˆ ∈ C a
secret subspace. Choose some κ ∈ Fk×nq such that rowsp(κ) = κˆ. We will hide the key
by a set of features, A ⊂ Fkq with |A| = t ≥ ` and a set B ⊂ Fkq \ A. Let λ : Fkq → Fnq be
a random map such that λ(x) 6∈ κˆ for all x ∈ B. Define the sets,
Pauth = {(x,xκ) | x ∈ A},
Pchaff = {(x, λ(x)) | x ∈ B},
and
V = Pauth ∪ Pchaff.
For a set S ⊂ Fkq , we will denote by 〈S〉κ the subspace spanned by the elements
{sκ | s ∈ S} and 〈S〉λ the set spanned by the elements {λ(s) | s ∈ S}. In order for a
witness to decommit κˆ, a set W ⊂ Fkq is submitted and the second coordinates of the
elements in the vault whose first coordinates correspond to W are used to generate a
subspace, Wˆ . This subspace is then decoded to yield a codeword of C.
We will require the following assumptions. Firstly, all points associated with the vault
are randomly chosen. Secondly, an authentic witness always submits a set of features,W ,
such that |W \A| and |A \W | are small relative to `. With the randomness assumption
from earlier, this would imply that with high probability, 〈W \ A〉λ = |W \ A| and
〈A \W 〉κ = |A \W |. Furthermore, 〈A \W 〉κ ∩ 〈W \A〉λ = {0}.
Theorem 6.2.1. Let A,W ⊂ Fkq be the authentic and witness sets respectively. Under
the assumptions above, an authentic witness can recover the key if
d4(A,W ) ≤ 1
2
(dminS (C)− 1).
Proof. We can express Wˆ = (Wˆ ∩ κˆ) ⊕ E, for some subspace E ⊂ Fnq . Thus, we can
uniquely recover κˆ from Wˆ if
dS(Wˆ , κˆ) ≤ 1
2
(dminS (C)− 1).
We obtain
d4(A,W ) = |W \A|+ |A \W |
= dim(〈W \A〉λ) + dim(〈A \W 〉κ)
= dim(〈W \A〉λ) + k − dim(〈A ∩W 〉k)
= dim(E) + k − dim(kˆ ∩ Wˆ )
≤ 1
2
(dminS (C)− 1).
The second equality follows the assumptions regarding authentic witnesses, and the
fourth equality follows since E = 〈W \A〉λ and 〈A \W 〉κ ∩ 〈W \A〉λ = {0}.
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The assumptions made for Theorem 6.2.1 to hold are generic assumptions that are
expected for an authentic witness. If W is not an authentic witness, we must consider
the possibility of a false positive.
We first note that it is not an advantage for an attacker to submit a large witness
set, W . Even if Wˆ contains the key space, i.e. Wˆ ⊃ κˆ, we would have
dS(Wˆ , κˆ) = dim(Wˆ + κˆ)− dim(Wˆ ∩ κˆ)
= dim(Wˆ )− dim(κˆ).
Therefore, if
dim(Wˆ ) > `+
1
2
(dminS (C)− 1), (6.3)
we cannot recover the key. This gives a bound for the size of any useful witness set since
any witness of larger size will necessarily also have larger distance.
A witness, W , is a false positive if
dS(Wˆ , κˆ) ≤ 1
2
(dminS (C)− 1)
and
d4(W,A) >
1
2
(dminS (C)− 1).
We always have the possibility of false positives because of the dependence relations
inherent in working with subspaces. A false positive can occur if
1. dim(Wˆ ) < |W |,
2. dim(κˆ) < |A|, or
3. dim(Wˆ ∩ κˆ) > |W ∩A|.
Under randomness assumptions, for large n and small witness size (recall, a large
witness is not of value for an attacker), the probability of (1) is negligable. That is, we
expect randomly chosen points of the vault to be independent if the number of points
chosen is less than the dimension of the space (for instance one can invoke Lemma 6.3.1
in the following section). (2) is a design concern which can be mitigated by taking dim(κˆ)
close to |A|. Again under randomness assumptions, the probability of (3) will be low,
since we expect dim(Wˆ ∩ κˆ) = |W ∩A|. In general, vault sizes need to be quite large in
order to have good estimates for security against brute force attacks. Therefore, we will
assume the assumptions required to neglect the possibility of false positives hold.
6.3 Security and Considerations
We can estimate the security of this system by a similar method as for the PFV system.
In particular, we want to find a parameter δ such that if δ < t elements of the vault
are taken and the second coordinates of these elements are considered, then with high
probability, these δ elements belong to κˆ.
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Lemma 6.3.1. [46] Let ` ≤ δ ≤ n. The number of δ × n matrices over Fq of rank ` is
given by
Nq(`, δ, n) =
(∏`−1
i=0 q
n − qi
)(∏`−1
i=0 q
δ − qi
)
∏`−1
i=0 q
` − qi .
In the following, a strategy is described which tries to find a set in Fnq containing `
linearly independent vectors that are meant to reveal the authentic features. Assume
now that there are t authentic points and r − t chaff points, with the set of features
{x1, . . . ,xt} a set of random elements of Fkq . We can assume that the second coordinates
of the authentic set {x1κ, . . . ,xtκ} contains a set of ` linearly independent vectors in
Fnq , since from Lemma 6.3.1 the probability that {x1, . . . ,xt} contains ` independent
elements rapidly approaches 1 by Lemma 6.3.1. Now, the expected number of subsets of
size δ out of r > δ random points in Fnq that span a `-dimensional space can be estimated
by
αq(`, δ, n) =
(
r
δ
)
Nq(`, δ, n)
qδn
.
Ideally an attacker would want to find δ0 ≤ |A| = t so that αq(`, δ0, n) < 1 in order to
have a high probability of recovering the key in the event that the δ0 points span a space
of dimension `. On the other side, to counter this type of attack, one tries to keep ` very
close to t and r large enough, so that αq is not too small.
We will approximate the complexity of a brute force attack following this approach.
The attack is similar in approach to that proposed in [55], although adjusted for the SFV
variant.
It takes n(δ2− δ)/2 operations to row reduce a δ×n binary matrix. We will use this
approximation, even when the field is not binary. Hence, following the proof of [55] we
obtain the following upper bound for the expected time to recover the key.
Corollary 6.3.2. In the above setting, let δ0 be so that α2(`, δ0, n) < 1. On average, an
attacker can recover the secret key in C ·(r/t)` operations, where C < .55·n(`2−`)(r−`)nl.
Proof. Let δ0 be such that αq(`, δ, n) ≤ 1. From [15], the average number of attempts
for a user to guess ` points in the authentic set is(
r
`
)(
t
`
) < 1.1(r/t)`,
for r > t > 5. We proceed as follows:
1. Choose a random set, T , of size ` from the second coordinates of the vault and
compute the echelon form of T . This requires approximately n(`2−`)/2 operations.
2. Guess a point v from the second coordinate of the vault, but not in T . Check if
v ∈ 〈T 〉Fq . It requires nl operations to check if v ∈ 〈T 〉Fq and we must check at
most r − |T | points.
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3. If no point is found, discard T and go to 1. If a point is found, add it to T and go
to 2. Continue until |T | = δ0.
Under the assumption that the only time a point is found in step 3 occurs when
T corresponds to a subset of A, the complexity can be approximated by counting the
number of expected operations to choose ` elements of A and the approximate number
of operations to rebuild the key. If it takes approximately 1.1(r/t)` attempts to guess
a valid set for T , then all previous attempts failed. For each incorrect choice of T , the
process of verifying that T is incorrect requires at most
n(`2 − `)
2
(r − `)nl
operations. The result follows.
Remark 6.3.3. Suppose that the number of reliably extractable features is fixed by
some feature extraction algorithm and suppose this number is t. Then in a PFV scheme,
the minimum distance of the Reed-Solomon code underpinning the system will be t−`+1
and the number of keys will be q` for some ` < t. In order to increase the number of
keys while maintaining a fixed minimum distance, a designer would have to increase
q. Parameter trade-offs are different in the subspace metric. As an illustration, if we
choose a spread code S ⊂ Grq(`, c`), we can take any ` ≤ t and encode our features as a
codeword from S. The minimum distance will then be 2` and the number of keys will be
qc`−1
q`−1 . Note that we can increase the number of keys and the error correction capabilities
simultaneously. We can also fix ` and still increase the number of keys. Furthermore,
these considerations do not rely on changing the field size. This means one that can
trade-off storage space without compromising the parameters of the system or possibly
having to modify the feature extraction algorithm to work with other fields.
Remark 6.3.4. We also would like to make a remark about the features. In order for
the features for the PFV vault to be applicable, they must be representable as elements
of Fq for some q. If q = 2m, then we have the canonical isomorphism F2m ∼= Fm2 .
Therefore, features for using the SFV scheme are compatible with features from the PFV
scheme. In the PFV scheme, the key is dependent on the representation of the features
(the coefficients of the key polynomial must come from F2m . In the SFV version, the
matrix, κ, which encodes the key, κˆ, must have size m × n, but κˆ can have dimension
smaller than or equal to m. This allows for more flexibility in designing an appropriate
constant-dimension code for the system.
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Appendix A
MAGMA Code
A.1 Computing Elements of Rank One
// Input must be a matrix G with coefficients belonging to a field F
// of cardinality q^m
RankOne := function(G)
G := EchelonForm(G);
G := RowSubmatrix(G, 1, Rank(G));
k := Rank(G);
n := Ncols(G);
Eqn_Matrix := G;
for i := 1 to k by 1 do
for j := 1 to n by 1 do
Eqn_Matrix[i,j] := Eqn_Matrix[i,j]^(q)-Eqn_Matrix[i,j];
end for;
end for;
Eqn_Matrix_Exp := ZeroMatrix(BaseField(F), k, m*n);
for i := 1 to k by 1 do
for j := 1 to n by 1 do
for jj := 1 to m by 1 do
Eqn_Matrix_Exp[i, m*(jj-1) + j] := Eltseq(Eqn_Matrix[i,j])[jj];
end for;
end for;
end for;
Mq := BasisMatrix(Nullspace(Eqn_Matrix_Exp));
M := ZeroMatrix(F, Nrows(Mq), Ncols(Mq));
for i := 1 to Nrows(Mq) by 1 do
for j := 1 to Ncols(Mq) by 1 do
82
M[i,j] := (F ! Mq[i,j]);
end for;
end for;
return M*G;
end function;
A.2 Generator Matrix for Gabidulin Code
// A random Gabidulin code is constructed. This function assumes that F is a field of
// size q^m .The parameters must satisfy k <= n <= m.
Gabidulin := function (n,k)
gq := ZeroMatrix(BaseField(F), m, n);
while Rank(gq) lt n do
g := RandomMatrix(F, 1, n);
for i := 1 to m by 1 do
for j := 1 to n by 1 do
gq[i,j] := Eltseq(g[1,j])[i];
end for;
end for;
end while;
G := ZeroMatrix (F, k, n);
for i := 0 to k-1 by 1 do
for j := 1 to n by 1 do
G[i+1,j] := g[1, j]^(q^i);
end for;
end for;
return G;
end function;
A.3 Cryptanalysis of CS Variant
// This algorithm constructs a random column scrambling matrix and proceeds to
// compute the elements of rank one in the extended matrix. G must be a generator
// matrix for the Gabidulin code of size k by n. t is the error correction capability
// of the Gabidulin code and 0 < t1 < t is a design parameter.
// Construct P;
P := ZeroMatrix(F, n, n);
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while Rank(P) lt n do
Q1 := RandomMatrix (F, n, t-t1);
Q2q := RandomMatrix (BaseField(F), n, n-t+t1);
Q2 := ZeroMatrix (F, n, n-t+t1);
for i := 1 to n by 1 do
for j := 1 to n-t+t1 by 1 do
Q2[i,j] := (F ! Q2q[i,j]);
end for;
end for;
P := HorizontalJoin (Q1, Q2);
end while;
// Create error e of rank at most t1 and the public generator matrix Gpub.
// Construct y, an encrypted message.
etemp := RandomMatrix (F, 1, t1);
Eq := RandomMatrix (BaseField(F), t1, n);
E := ZeroMatrix(F, t1, n);
for i := 1 to t1 by 1 do
for j := 1 to n by 1 do
E[i,j] := (F ! Eq[i,j]);
end for;
end for;
e := etemp*E;
Gpub := Gabidulin(n,k)*P^(-1);
message := RandomMatrix(F, 1, k);
y := message*Gpub + e;
// Calculate U a Grassmann support matrix for the space spanned by the elements
// of rank one in the extended matrix and H a parity check matrix.
Gext := VerticalJoin (Gpub, e);
Gtemp := Gext;
for l := 1 to t1-1 by 1 do
for i := 1 to k+1 by 1 do
for j := 1 to n by 1 do
Gtemp[i,j] := Gtemp[i,j]^(q);
end for;
end for;
Gext := VerticalJoin (Gext, Gtemp);
end for;
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U := RankOne (Gext);
Ctemp := LinearCode(U);
H := ParityCheckMatrix(Ctemp);
// Compute the message
message := Solution(Gpub*Transpose(H), y*Transpose(H));
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